Results 121 to 130 of about 6,458,136 (325)

Two-Agent Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Agents: Almost Full Characterizations [PDF]

, 2010
Michele Lombardi
openalex   +1 more source

Sales or Profits? Managerial Decision‐Making in a Duopoly With Symmetric and Asymmetric Costs

Managerial and Decision Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT The paper examines the performance of firms when managers can choose sales or profit maximization strategies and when costs can be symmetric or asymmetric. Three competitive scenarios are examined: both firms choose profit maximization strategies, both firms choose sales maximization strategies, and one firm chooses profit and its rival ...
Malcolm Brady
wiley   +1 more source

A Slacks-Based Measure Model for Computing Game Cross-Efficiency

Systems
This paper introduces an improved slack-based game cross-efficiency measurement model that enhances the existing cross-efficiency framework and integrates it with the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) game cross-efficiency.
Tingyang Huang, Shuangjie Li, Fang Liu, Hongyu Diao   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

The Methodological Bases for the Development of the Country’s Tax Policy [PDF]

Problemi Ekonomiki
The article is devoted to the problems of determining the methodological bases for the development of the country’s tax policy. The institutional powers of the main regulators of tax policy are defined.
Kaneva Tetiana V., Kryvonos Dmytro A.
doaj   +1 more source

Two-agent Nash implementation: A new result [PDF]

[Moore and Repullo, \emph{Econometrica} \textbf{58} (1990) 1083-1099] and [Dutta and Sen, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{58} (1991) 121-128] are two fundamental papers on two-agent Nash implementation. Both of them are based on Maskin's classic paper [
Wu, Haoyang
core   +1 more source

Contracting Institutions and R&D Collaboration Between Nonrivals in Competitive Industry Equilibrium

Managerial and Decision Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In a duopoly model, one firm has the option to collaborate in R&D with a third party. Although collaboration can expedite innovation, the third party may unintentionally leak the innovation to the rival firm. Engaging in R&D collaboration can make the rival firm anticipate a free ride, which weakens its incentives for R&D spending.
Travis Ng
wiley   +1 more source

Deep learning accelerated the discovery of multi‐principal element alloys with various strength‐toughness trade‐offs

Materials Genome Engineering Advances, EarlyView.
Coupling deep generative models with Pareto optimization, we uncover eight multiprincipal element alloys that outperform existing strength–toughness records after only three design–test cycles, showcasing a rapid data‐efficient route to balanced‐property alloy discovery across high‐dimensional composition spaces.
Chunhui Fan, Hong Luo, Qiancheng Zhao, Xuefei Wang, Hongxu Cheng, Yue Chang   +5 more
wiley   +1 more source

Relationships between Non-Bossiness and Nash Implementability [PDF]

We explore the relationships between non-bossiness and Nash implementability. We provide a new domain-richness condition, weak monotonic closedness, and prove that on weakly monotonically closed domains, non-bossiness together with individual ...
Hideki Mizukami, Takuma Wakayama
core  

USING NON-INVASIVE BIOMARKERS AND PLACE OF CYTOKERATIN 18 IN DIAGNOSIS PATIENTS WITH NON-ALCOHOLIC FATTY LIVER DISEASE

Ukrainian Scientific Medical Youth Journal, 2016
The aim of this study was: 1.Determination of optimum degree of non-invasive diagnostic methods steatosis and liver fibrosis in clinical practice. 2. Determination of the diagnostic value of the CK 18, compared with clinical biomarkers of the degree of ...
N. V. Dynnyk
doaj  

Secure implementation [PDF]

Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks.
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, Sjostrom, Tomas, Yamato, Takehiko   +2 more
core   +4 more sources