Results 261 to 270 of about 11,359 (301)

Implementation Via Nash Equilibria

Econometrica, 1992
The author provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a social choice correspondance to be Nash Implementable. With three or more participants this condition is what he calls essential monotonicity.
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Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium

Econometrica, 1991
The two-person case needs to be considered separately. We provide a complete characterization of virtually implementable two-person social choice functions. While not all two-person social choice functions are virtually implementable, our necessary and sufficient condition is simple.
Abreu, Dilip, Sen, Arunava
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Nash implementation via hyperfunctions

Social Choice and Welfare, 2006
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Özkal-Sanver, İpek, Sanver, M. Remzi
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Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria [PDF]

Social Choice and Welfare, 1997
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Double implementation in Nash and -Nash equilibria

Economics Letters, 2012
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Double Implementation in Nash and Undominated Nash Equilibria

Journal of Economic Theory, 1993
The author introduces the concept of double implementation (Nash and Undominated Nash). He proves that with at least three agents Maskin's monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for double implementation in a large class of economic environments.
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The revelation approach to nash implementation

Economics Letters, 1992
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Mookherjee, Dilip, Reichelstein, Stefan
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Nash implementation and double implementation: equivalence theorems

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1999
In the case of implementation in Nash equilibria or of implementation in undominated Nash equilibria mechanisms have been proposed. However, for the mechanisms proposed for Nash equilibria, the set of undominated Nash equilibrium outcomes may be strictly smaller than the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes.
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Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation

Social Choice and Welfare, 2008
In this paper, we reconsider the full characterization of two-agent Nash implementation provided in the celebrated papers by Moore and Repullo (Econometrica 58:1083–1099, 1990) and Dutta and Sen (Rev Econ Stud 58:121–128, 1991), since we are able to show that the characterizing conditions are not logically independent.
BUSETTO, Francesca, CODOGNATO, Giulio
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Refining Nash Implementation

1996
In the two preceding chapters we have studied the Nash equilibrium approach to the problem of implementation. Various authors have put forward certain undesirable consequences of the property of monotonicity which, as you will remember, is a necessary condition for implementation in Nash equilibria.
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