Results 281 to 290 of about 6,458,136 (325)

Exploring health literacy development through co-design: understanding the expectations for health literacy mediators. [PDF]

Health Promot Int
Spencer M, Cruickshank V, Kemp N, Nash R.   +3 more
europepmc   +1 more source

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Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization

Econometrica, 1990
The authors extend E. Maskin's results on Nash implementation. First, they establish a condition that is both necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability if there are three or more agents (the case covered by Maskin's sufficiency result). Second--and more important--they examine the two-agent case (for which there existed no general sufficiency ...
Moore, John, Repullo, Rafael
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Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation

Social Choice and Welfare, 2017
Mechanisms for Nash implementation in the literature are fragile in the sense that they fail if just one or two players do not follow their equilibrium strategy. A mechanism is outcome-robust if its equilibrium outcome is not affected by any deviating minority of players. Is Nash implementation possible with outcome-robust mechanisms? I first show that
George F. N. Shoukry
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Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation

Social Choice and Welfare, 2008
In this paper, we reconsider the full characterization of two-agent Nash implementation provided in the celebrated papers by Moore and Repullo (Econometrica 58:1083–1099, 1990) and Dutta and Sen (Rev Econ Stud 58:121–128, 1991), since we are able to show that the characterizing conditions are not logically independent.
BUSETTO, Francesca, CODOGNATO, Giulio
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Nash implementation and the bargaining problem

Social Choice and Welfare, 2006
We study Nash implementation of the bargaining solutions in a cake sharing set up. We argue that the minimal Pareto optimal, symmetric and Nash implementable SBS is the one inducing all Pareto optimal and midpoint-domi- nating utility vectors in each state.
H. Vartiainen
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Nash implementation in production economies

Economic Theory, 1995
This paper provides a general way to incorporate private ownership production economies into the implementation of the Walrasian correspondence. We present two mechanisms, both of which permit agents to behave strategically with respect to their initial endowments, preferences, and production possibility sets. The first mechanism deals with the case of
Lu Hong
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Nash-Implementation of the No-Envy Solution on Symmetric Domains of Economies

Games Econ. Behav., 2016
We show that a simple game form, which resembles the “Divide-and-Choose” procedure, Nash-implements the no-envy solution on domains of economies where the set of feasible allocations is symmetric (an allocation obtained from a feasible allocation by ...
Battal Doğan
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria [PDF]

Social Choice and Welfare, 1997
We deal with the implementation problem where agents in some groups can cooperate (or form coalitions) and in some others cannot. We consider a situation where the planner does not know whether agents in a group can cooperate or not. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a correspondence to be implementable in such a situation.
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The revelation approach to nash implementation

Economics Letters, 1992
Abstract Recent work on implementation has established necessary and sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in Nash equilibrium strategies. These conditions need to distinguish the case of two agents from that of three or more agents in the organization.
Mookherjee, Dilip, Reichelstein, Stefan
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Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium

Econometrica, 1991
The two-person case needs to be considered separately. We provide a complete characterization of virtually implementable two-person social choice functions. While not all two-person social choice functions are virtually implementable, our necessary and sufficient condition is simple.
Abreu, Dilip, Sen, Arunava
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