Results 291 to 300 of about 6,458,136 (325)

Mixed Nash Implementation with Finite Mechanisms

, 2012
This paper studies full implementation problems in (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium in finite environments. We restrict the designer to adoptfinite mechanisms, thus ruling out integer games.
C. Mezzetti, L. Renou
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Double implementation in Nash and -Nash equilibria

Economics Letters, 2012
Abstract In this paper, we give a sufficient condition for double implementation in Nash and M -Nash equilibria. Furthermore, we discuss the mechanism with transfers and prove that some important social choice rules are doubly implemented in Nash and M -Nash equilibria by the mechanism with transfers.
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Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability

Economics Letters, 2008
Abstract We reexamine Maskin's Theorem by proposing slight modifications on Maskin's conditions of monotonicity and no veto power. We show that any social choice correspondence (SCC) that satisfies strict monotonicity, strict no veto power and unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria.
Doghmi, Ahmed, Ziad, Abderrahmane
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STRATEGY SPACE REDUCTION IN MASKIN'S THEOREM: SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR NASH IMPLEMENTATION

, 1988
Contributions by E. Maskin and S. Williams have established that any social choice cor respondence satisfying monotonicity, no veto power, and having at lea st three participants is Nash implementable under the proviso that th e number of social ...
Tatsuyoshi Saijo
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Implementation Via Nash Equilibria

Econometrica, 1992
This paper is concerned with a problem of implementation of a given social choice correspondence. The authors introduces an essential monotonicity condition and show that any implementable social choice correspondence satisfies this condition. Conversely, in a case of three or more participants, any essentially monotone social choice correspondence is ...
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Nash implementation via hyperfunctions

Social Choice and Welfare, 2006
Hyperfunctions are social choice rules which assign sets of alternatives to preference profiles over sets. Therefore, they are more general objects compared to standard (social choice) correspondences. In fact, every correspondence can be expressed in terms of an equivalent hyperfunction.
İpek Özkal-Sanver, M. Remzi Sanver
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On Nash-Implementation in the Presence of Withholding

Games and Economic Behavior, 1995
Abstract In this paper we construct a completely feasible and continuous mechanism whose Nash allocations coincide with Lindahl allocations when both preferences and initial endowments are unknown to the designer and unreported endowments are withheld.
Qi Li, Guoqiang Tian
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Double Implementation in Nash and Undominated Nash Equilibria

Journal of Economic Theory, 1993
Abstract This paper studies the issue of designing mechanisms that are applicable to a wide class of individual behavior in exchange economies with both "goods" and "bads." We propose a mechanism such that for each possible preference profile, both the set of Nash equilibrium allocations and the set of undominated Nash equilibrium allocations ...
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Nash implementation of Lindahl allocations [PDF]

Social Choice and Welfare, 1994
We define a class of Nash based mechanisms that implement Lindahl allocations in standard public good economies. As those that first proved Nash implementation of Lindahl allocations, defined by Hurwicz (1979) and Walker (1981), the mechanisms provided here are continuous, feasible, and independent of agents' characteristics.
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Refining Nash Implementation

1996
In the two preceding chapters we have studied the Nash equilibrium approach to the problem of implementation. Various authors have put forward certain undesirable consequences of the property of monotonicity which, as you will remember, is a necessary condition for implementation in Nash equilibria.
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