Results 301 to 310 of about 6,458,136 (325)

Pure Strategy Nash Implementation with Finite Mechanisms

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
Canonical mechanisms have unattractive features because they have to cover every instances of the implementation problem. This is unavoidable but at the same time it leaves open whether these features can be avoided in all specific cases or even most of them. We focus on one such feature: The infinity of the message space.
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Nash implementation and double implementation: equivalence theorems

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1999
Abstract This paper contains a full characterization of doubly implementable social choice correspondences (SCC's) in Nash equilibria and undominated Nash equilibria in general environments. We show that in the case of at least three agents, an SCC is doubly implementable if and only if it is Nash implementable.
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A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation

, 1991
The main result of this paper is to characterize the class of two-person social choice correspondences which are Nash-implementable. The characterization result is used to formulate domain restrictions which allow the construction of non-dictatorial and ...
Bhaskar Dutta, Arunava Sen
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Equivalence of Nash implementability and robust implementability with incomplete information [PDF]

Social Choice and Welfare, 1994
This paper is concerned with the design of robust mechanisms which are applicable to a wide class of possible information structures of agents. We examine a society consisting of several groups such that (i) there are at least three agents in each group; and (ii) each agent knows the preferences of the agents in his group but has incomplete information
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Implementation in Strong Nash Equilibrium

1991
In this chapter we commence a discussion of implementation in cooperative equilibria; we shall consider the most important case, that of strong Nash implementation. Only little is known about implication in other types of equilibria.
H. Keiding, J. Abdou
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Nash Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution by a Natural Mechanism

SSRN Electronic Journal, 1998
We provide natural mechanisms for the Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution if the set of possible payoff allocations is unknown to the planner. The need for two different mechanisms arises, because the case of three or more agents and that of two require separate treatment.
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Nash implementation of the majority rule

Economics Letters, 2006
Abstract Given a society confronting two alternatives, we show that the absolute majority rule is the minimal Nash implementable extension of the relative majority rule.
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Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization

Social Choice and Welfare, 2019
N. Yoshihara, A. Yamada
semanticscholar   +1 more source

On nash implementation of social choice correspondences

Games and Economic Behavior, 1992
Abstract In this paper, we extend Danilov's conditions for Nash implementation to weak preferences over an arbitrary set of alternatives. We show that a certain condition of “strong monotonicity” is necessary for Nash implementation if the domain of preferences is sufficiently large.
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Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities

Games Econ. Behav., 2017
Taro Kumano
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