Results 1 to 10 of about 90 (87)
Matrix-Based Method for the Analysis and Control of Networked Evolutionary Games: A Survey
In this paper, a detailed survey is presented for the analysis and control of networked evolutionary games via the matrix method. The algebraic form of networked evolutionary games is firstly recalled.
Xinrong Yang, Zhenping Geng, Haitao Li
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So far, most studies on networked evolutionary game have focused on a single update rule. This paper investigated the seeking of the Nash Equilibrium and strategy consensus of the evolutionary networked game with mixed updating rules. First, we construct
Yalin Gui, Chengyuan Du, Lixin Gao
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On Robust Stability and Stabilization of Networked Evolutionary Games with Time Delays
This paper investigates the robust stability and stabilization of networked evolutionary games (NEGs) with time delays. First, a mathematical model is presented to describe the dynamics of NEG with time-varying delays and disturbances.
Qiguang An, Hongfeng Guo, Yating Zheng
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Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: a colloquium [PDF]
Networks form the backbone of many complex systems, ranging from the Internet to human societies. Accordingly, not only is the range of our interactions limited and thus best described and modeled by networks, it is also a fact that the networks that are an integral part of such models are often interdependent or even interconnected.
Wang, Zhen +3 more
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Bipartite graphs as models of population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. [PDF]
By combining evolutionary game theory and graph theory, "games on graphs" study the evolutionary dynamics of frequency-dependent selection in population structures modeled as geographical or social networks.
Jorge Peña, Yannick Rochat
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Optimal Control of Networked Evolutionary Games With Bankruptcy Risk
This paper studies the optimal control problem for a class of networked evolutionary games (NEGs) with bankruptcy risk. Firstly, an algebraic expression is formulated for the given NEGs via the semi-tensor product.
Xinling Li, Lei Deng, Jianli Zhao
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Exploring the performance of volatile mutations on evolutionary game dynamics in complex networks
The typical framework of replicator dynamics in evolutionary game theory assumes that all mutations are equally likely, meaning that the mutation of an evolving inhabitant only contributes constantly.
K.M. Ariful Kabir +2 more
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Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games [PDF]
7 two-column pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific ...
Wang, Zhen, Szolnoki, Attila, Perz, M
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Coevolutionary games on networks [PDF]
9 pages RevTeX, 5 figures ...
Ebel, Holger, Bornholdt, Stefan
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Evolutionary games defined at the network mesoscale: The Public Goods game [PDF]
The evolutionary dynamics of the Public Goods game addresses the emergence of cooperation within groups of individuals. However, the Public Goods game on large populations of interconnected individuals has been usually modeled without any knowledge about their group structure.
Jesús Gómez-Gardeñes +4 more
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