Results 111 to 120 of about 14,506,298 (234)
Single NTU-value solutions [PDF]
We propose a variation of the Hart and Mas-Colell non-cooperative bargaining model for n-person games in coalitional form. This strategic game implements, in the limit, a new NTU-value for the class of monotonic games.
Emililo Calvo
core
Opinion: Adapting to the challenges of wildlife management in the 21st Century
Wildlife Society Bulletin, EarlyView.
Aniruddha V. Belsare +1 more
wiley +1 more source
Abstract This paper studies how litigation and settlement behaviour is affected by agents motivated by spiteful preferences under the American fee‐shifting rule compared to the English one. We conduct an experiment and find that litigation expenditures are overall higher under the English rule compared to the American rule—even for low‐merit cases ...
Wladislaw Mill, Jonathan Stäbler
wiley +1 more source
Open loop and feedback solutions to an institutional game under non-quadratic preferences [PDF]
Until now most research in dynamic games focus on models with quadratic objective functions because of practical considerations. But in reality, all problems are not quadratic.
Fabien NGENDAKURIYO
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Abstract I argue that economists' distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ economic theory is often based on papers' stylistic markers rather than their methodology or scope. I illustrate this point with a model of price competition for boundedly rational consumers, due to Piccione and Spiegler. I first present its original, ‘pure style’ version.
Ran Spiegler
wiley +1 more source
From Coase to culture? Visible Hands Build Equilibria
Abstract This essay proposes that the classic distinction between firms and markets in Ronald Coase's 1937 paper ‘The nature of the firm’ (Economica, vol. 4, pp. 386–405) be gracefully retired, having been duly celebrated for its field‐launching contribution to organizational economics.
Robert Gibbons
wiley +1 more source
Abstract A laboratory experiment finds that teams acting as a decision‐making unit through communication behave more efficiently than individuals. Decision‐making units vote on formal and informal sanctions in a repeated public goods dilemma. When a formal scheme is selected, teams vote for deterrent sanction rates more frequently than individuals ...
Kenju Kamei, Katy Tabero
wiley +1 more source
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design under EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach [PDF]
This paper analyzes the problem of designing macroeconomic stabilization policies within the European Monetary Union (EMU) as a dynamic game between a centralized monetary authority, the European Central Bank (ECB), and national fiscal policy makers. Non-
Joseph Plasmans +3 more
core
Abstract This paper is a response to John Betz's book, Christ, the Logos of Creation: An Essay in Analogical Metaphysics (Emmaus Academic, 2023). The essay confines itself to answering two methodological questions, namely: Does Przywara's approach to analogy indeed represent the basic form (‘Denkform’) that analogy has ‘always assumed’ in Catholic ...
Archie J. Spencer
wiley +1 more source
Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game
URL des Documents de travail : http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/cesdp2017.htmlDocuments de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2017.15R - ISSN : 1955-611X - Version originale Février 2017, révisée en Mai 2017Traditionally social sciences are ...
Levando, Dmitry
core +1 more source

