Results 191 to 200 of about 4,067 (223)

Research Design Processes in Serious Games for Adolescent Mental Health: Systematic Review. [PDF]

JMIR Serious Games
Rooij de ST, Kuipers DA, Prins JT, Pierie JPEN.   +3 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Analysing public goods games using reinforcement learning: effect of increasing group size on cooperation. [PDF]

R Soc Open Sci
Tamura K, Morita S.
europepmc   +1 more source

Analyzing gaze and hand movement patterns in leader-follower interactions during a time-continuous cooperative manipulation task. [PDF]

Front Psychol
Cheng M, Zahedi A, Schubotz RI, Wörgötter F, Tamosiunaite M.   +4 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Iconicity Gives Communicators a Head-Start, Even if Only the Producer Experiences It. [PDF]

Open Mind (Camb)
Snider R, Kaklamanis P, Roberts G.
europepmc   +1 more source

Compromise or Alternation? Experimental Evidence on Coordination Under Payoff Asymmetry. [PDF]

Behav Sci (Basel)
Lv Y, Wang H, Wu L, Zheng J.
europepmc   +1 more source

Why organisational diversity matters in a circular economy and society.

Resour Conserv Recycl
Van Opstal W, Bocken N, Brusselaers J.
europepmc   +1 more source

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Non-cooperative finite element games

Applied Numerical Mathematics, 2021
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Danny Smyl, Liang Chen, Li Lai, Dong Liu
openaire   +2 more sources

Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Non-Cooperative Games

1988
This paper is concerned with eliciting cooperative behavior in two persons finitely repeated non-cooperative games. It is argued that whenever there are three equilibria such that the Players’ preferences are in reversed order then, under some conditions, cooperation may be initiated and recursively maintained leading to a unique point on the Pareto ...
Michel Moreaux, Jean-Pierre Ponssard, Patrick Rey   +2 more
openaire   +1 more source

FiniteN-person non-cooperative games with unique equilibrium points

International Journal of Game Theory, 1981
A necessary and sufficient condition is found for a given completely mixed strategyN-tuple to be the unique equilibrium point of some finiteN-person non-cooperative game.
openaire   +2 more sources

A non-cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon

Economics Letters, 1986
Abstract For an alternating offer bargaining game with an uncertain horizon, the equilibrium payoff to a player is greater, the less risk averse is he relative to his opponent. As the horizon becomes infinite in length, the equilibrium partition converges to the Nash bargaining solution.
openaire   +1 more source