Results 241 to 250 of about 7,040,880 (266)

In defense of non-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony

Synthese, 2014
Almost everyone agrees that many testimonial beliefs constitute knowledge. According to non-reductionists, some testimonial beliefs possess positive epistemic status independent of that conferred by perception, memory, and induction. Recently, Jennifer Lackey has provided a counterexample to a popular version of this view.
Timothy Perrine
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Non-Reductionism and Special Concern

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2007
The so-called ‘Extreme Claim’ asserts that reductionism about personal identity leaves each of us with no reason to be specially concerned about his or her own future. Both advocates and opponents of the Extreme Claim, whether of a reductionist or non-reductionist stripe, accept that similar problems do not arise for non-reductionism.
Jens Johansson
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It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non‐Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony

2006
AbstractHow precisely do we successfully acquire justified belief from either the spoken or written word of others? This question is at the center of the epistemology of testimony, and the current philosophical literature contains only two general options for answering it: reductionism and non-reductionism.
Jennifer Lackey, Lackey Jennifer
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Semantic Non-Reductionism

Abstract It is argued that the foundational or metasemantic question of what it is for words to mean what they do cannot be answered in reductive terms, that is, in terms that do not presuppose meaning; yet a constructive, non-quietist answer can be provided.
Claudine Verheggen
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Non-Reductionism and John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1995
As one would expect, John Searle's latest book The Rediscovery of the Mind, is a daring and controversial work. It is a blunt and lively book, as is exhibited by the title that didn't make it: "What's wrong with the Philosophy of Mind?" Searle's long term goal is to bring consciousness back to center stage in the philosophy of mind from the rather ...
Brian J. Garrett, John Searle
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Parfitian or Buddhist reductionism? Revisiting a debate about personal identity [PDF]

Asian Journal of Philosophy
Derek Parfit influentially defends reductionism about persons, the view that a person’s existence just consists in the existence of a brain and body and the occurrence of a series of physical and mental events.
Javier Hidalgo
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The Continuity of Davidson’s Thought: Non-reductionism Without Quietism

2020
This chapter focuses on the continuity of Davidson’s thought. My goal is to show that two commonly held conceptions of Davidson’s philosophy, one to the effect that there is a shift from radical interpretation to triangulation, in particular, a shift from reductionism to non-reductionism, the other to the effect that Davidson’s non-reductionism is ...
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Criticism of reductionism and non-reductionism in the epistemology of Testimony

Epistemological researches,13(28 ...
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ON PERSONAL IDENTITY: DEFENCE OF A FORM OF NON-REDUCTIONISM

DANISH YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY, 1990
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Reductionism: Friend or Foe of an Integrative Social Psychology?

Social Psychology Quarterly, 2022
Neil J Mackinnon
exaly