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Cooperative Outcomes through Noncooperative Games
Games and Economic Behavior, 1994Stable solution sets describe a reasonable outcome of a cooperative game, i.e., of a conflict in which participants are free to form coalitions. One might expect that if coalitions are not allowed, outcome will be different; sometimes outcomes are indeed different, but the paper under review gives a reasonable example of a non-cooperative game for ...
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Nonconvexity in noncooperative game theory
International Journal of Game Theory, 1989zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Limit Consistent Solutions in Noncooperative Games
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1998zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Perea y Monsuwé, A., Peters, H.
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Approximation of Noncooperative Semi-Markov Games
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2006This paper deals with semi-Markov games under the standard expected ratio-average and the expected time-average criteria, and gives an approximation of a general V-ergodic semi-Markov game with a Borel state space by discrete-state space strong-ergodic games, as well as some new theorems on the existence of \(\varepsilon\)-equilibria.
Jaśkiewicz, A., Nowak, A. S.
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Noncooperative Games: Extensions
2015In Chaps. 2–5 we have studied noncooperative games in which the players have finitely many (pure) strategies. The reason for the finiteness restriction is that in such games special results hold, such as the existence of a value and optimal strategies for two-person zero-sum games, and the existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for finite ...
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2017
This book is aimed at students interested in using game theory as a design methodology for solving problems in engineering and computer science. The book shows that such design challenges can be analyzed through game theoretical perspectives that help to pinpoint each problem's essence: Who are the players? What are their goals?
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This book is aimed at students interested in using game theory as a design methodology for solving problems in engineering and computer science. The book shows that such design challenges can be analyzed through game theoretical perspectives that help to pinpoint each problem's essence: Who are the players? What are their goals?
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1994
1.1 Fundamental concepts and elementary properties. Let the noncooperative game $$ \Gamma = \left\langle {I,\{ x_i \} _{i \in I} ,\{ H_i \} _{i \in I} } \right\rangle $$ (1.1) be finite (see 1.3, Chapter 1). For each i ∈ I, we set \( x_i = \{ x_i^{\text{1}} ,...,x_i^{mi} \} \).
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1.1 Fundamental concepts and elementary properties. Let the noncooperative game $$ \Gamma = \left\langle {I,\{ x_i \} _{i \in I} ,\{ H_i \} _{i \in I} } \right\rangle $$ (1.1) be finite (see 1.3, Chapter 1). For each i ∈ I, we set \( x_i = \{ x_i^{\text{1}} ,...,x_i^{mi} \} \).
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International Journal of Game Theory, 1971
Noncooperative games in normal form and in characteristic function form are considered. The supergame of the noncooperative game is defined as an infinite sequence of plays of the original game. The notions of strong Pareto equilibrium point (s.p.e.p.) and essential core are introduced. A relationship between the essential core of a noncooperative game
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Noncooperative games in normal form and in characteristic function form are considered. The supergame of the noncooperative game is defined as an infinite sequence of plays of the original game. The notions of strong Pareto equilibrium point (s.p.e.p.) and essential core are introduced. A relationship between the essential core of a noncooperative game
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A Strong Equilibrium in Noncooperative Games
Computational Mathematics and Modeling, 2002This research work suggests a new concept of strong equilibrium in some classes of noncooperative games on compact sets having pure strategies. In order to justify it, the author indicates examples of static and differential games and uses pertinent references.
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