Results 51 to 60 of about 61,268 (231)
The economic foundations of powersharing: Evidence from Africa
American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.Abstract How—and with whom—do rulers share power? Existing research focuses on the strategic logic of powersharing. In this paper, we analyze its economic foundations. Powersharing is modeled as a subnational fiscal contract, in which rulers allocate political representation based on constituencies’ revenue potential. Empirically, we combine historical
Yannick I. Pengl, Philip Roessler
wiley +1 more source
Ensayos de EconomíaThis article develops a simple linear model of oligopoly and uses it to provide a detailed characterization of equilibrium prices, quantities, mark-ups, price elasticities of market demand; and welfare, all in terms of the parameters of the model.
Hernan Vallejo
doaj +1 more source
Cross‐Ownership and Welfare‐Inferior Price Competition with Relative Profit Delegation Contracts
Bulletin of Economic Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We consider management reward contracts based on relative profit performance under cross‐ownership and find nonequivalence of price and quantity competition. We also examine an endogenous choice of competition mode under unilateral cross‐ownership and show that the welfare‐inferior price competition can appear unless the product's ...
Mingqing Xing, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley +1 more source
Determinants of Profitability in Oligopoly and Oligopsony Markets [PDF]
جستارهای اقتصادی, 2005 This paper provides a theoretical model in which the firms within aprocessing industry behave in an oligopolistic and oligopsonisticmarket simultaneously.
Majid Ahmadian +1 more
doaj
The Challenges of Backsourcing
Financial Accountability &Management, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Public sector outsourcing sometimes ends in unexpected termination, forcing authorities to engage in backsourcing. The aim of this study is to identify the challenges posed by unexpected terminations of sourcing contracts in the public sector and analyze how actual practices in these situations diverge from theoretical expectations in the ...
Johan Berlin +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Pairwise Imitation and Tournament Graphs
International Economic Review, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper investigates strategic dynamics under the behavioral rule of pairwise interact and imitate (PII), which requires minimal information and emphasizes outperforming opponents in pairwise interactions. We characterize PII using weak tournament graphs and, for a broad class of dynamics, establish a one‐shot stability result for ...
Sung‐Ha Hwang +3 more
wiley +1 more source
, 1983 Actions a firm takes in one market may affect its profitability in other markets, beyond any joint economies or diseconomies in production. The reason is that an action in one market, by changing marginal costs in a second market, may change competitors' strategies in that second market.
Jeremy I. Bulow +2 more
openaire +1 more source
Labor Market Monopsony Power and the Dynamic Gains to Openness Reforms
International Economic Review, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We embed labor market monopsony into a dynamic heterogeneous‐firm general equilibrium model with exporting, horizontal FDI, and rich firm lifecycle dynamics. Rising marginal costs with monopsony slow and limit incumbent firm growth in response to liberalization, shifting adjustment to the extensive margin.
Priyaranjan Jha +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Strategic delegation and risk‐taking in R&D: Partial delegation versus full delegation
International Journal of Economic Theory, EarlyView.Abstract We examine firm's risk‐taking decisions in R&D under two different delegation strategies between partial delegation (PD) and full delegation (FD): FD authorizes both quantity and R&D risk but PD only authorizes quantity. Cournot firms under the FD set higher profit weights at the expected value of cost realization, which can lessen competition,
Mingqing Xing, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley +1 more source
Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a vertically differentiated duopoly
International Journal of Economic Theory, EarlyView.Abstract We investigate firms' strategic incentives to adopt environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) in the presence of quality–cost differences within a vertically differentiated duopoly. We find that (i) the low‐quality firm chooses a higher (lower) ECSR level than the high‐quality firm when the low‐quality firm has a relatively more ...
Mingqing Xing, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley +1 more source