Results 11 to 20 of about 2,996,602 (316)
Optimal Robust Contract Design [PDF]
We consider the robust contract design problem when the principal only has limited information about the actions the agent can take. The principal evaluates a contract according to its worst-case performance caused by the uncertain action space. Carroll (
Tang, Zhihao Gavin, Peng, Bo
core +5 more sources
Learning Approximately Optimal Contracts [PDF]
In principal-agent models, a principal offers a contract to an agent to perform a certain task. The agent exerts a level of effort that maximizes her utility. The principal is oblivious to the agent's chosen level of effort, and conditions her wage only on possible outcomes.
Alon Cohen +2 more
openaire +5 more sources
The Optimality of Team Contracts [PDF]
This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities. They can observe and verify each others’ effort levels and draft enforceable side-contracts on effort levels and realized returns.
Mehmet Barlo, Ayça Özdogan
openaire +6 more sources
The optimality of nominal contracts [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Guido Tabellini, Scott Freeman
openaire +5 more sources
Optimal Contracts for Experimentation [PDF]
This paper studies long-term contracts for experimentation in a principal-agent setting with adverse selection about the agent’s ability (pre-contractual hidden information), dynamic moral hazard, and private learning about project quality. We show that profit maximization by the principal generally leads to under-experimentation by an agent of low ...
Halac, Marina C. +2 more
openaire +3 more sources
On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
CALZOLARI, GIACOMO, A. Pavan
openaire +7 more sources
Invasion of Optimal Social Contracts
The stag-hunt game is a prototype for social contracts. Adopting a new and better social contract is usually challenging because the current one is already well established and stable due to sanctions imposed on non-conforming members. Thus, how does a population shift from the current social contract to a better one?
Alessandra F. Lütz +3 more
openaire +5 more sources
Optimal Contract Under Asymmetric Information About Fairness
Problem definition: To improve the poor performance of supply chains caused by misaligned incentives under the wholesale price contract, theory proposes coordinating contracts.
Zhang, Wen. +5 more
core +1 more source
Optimal Contracting in Networks
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Ali Jadbabaie, Ali Kakhbod
openaire +3 more sources
Optimal Reinsurance Problem under Fixed Cost and Exponential Preferences
We investigate an optimal reinsurance problem for an insurance company taking into account subscription costs: that is, a constant fixed cost is paid when the reinsurance contract is signed.
Matteo Brachetta, Claudia Ceci
doaj +1 more source

