Results 1 to 10 of about 105 (101)
A Note on Fernández–Coniglio’s Hierarchy of Paraconsistent Systems
A logic is called explosive if its consequence relation validates the so-called principle of ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet. A logic is called paraconsistent so long as it is not explosive.
Janusz Ciuciura
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Inconsistency, Paraconsistency and ?-Inconsistency
In this paper I’ll explore the relation between ?-inconsistency and plain inconsistency, in the context of theories that intend to capture semantic concepts. In particular, I’ll focus on two very well known inconsistent but non-trivial theories of truth:
Bruno Da Ré
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Metainferential Paraconsistency
In this article, our aim is to take a step towards a full understanding of the notion of paraconsistency in the context of metainferential logics. Following the work initiated by Barrio et al. [2018], we will consider a metainferential logic to be paraconsistent whenever the metainferential version of Explosion (or meta-Explosion) is invalid.
Bruno Da Ré +2 more
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Change of logic, without change of meaning
Abstract Change of logic is typically taken as requiring that the meanings of the connectives change too. As a result, it has been argued that legitimate rivalry between logics is under threat. This is, in a nutshell, the meaning‐variance argument, traditionally attributed to Quine.
Hitoshi Omori, Jonas R. B. Arenhart
wiley +1 more source
A new bridge principle for the normativity of logic
Abstract Logic appears to be normative for rational belief. The thesis of the normativity of logic holds that indeed logic has such a normative status. Gilbert Harman has questioned it, thereby giving rise to what has been called “Harman's skeptical challenge”.
Francesco Orilia
wiley +1 more source
Paraconsistent Transition Systems
In Proceedings LSFA 2022, arXiv:2303 ...
Cruz, Ana +2 more
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In this paper, we consider some paraconsistent calculi in a Hilbert-style formulation with the rule of detachment as the sole rule of interference.
Janusz Ciuciura
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Ideal Paraconsistent Logics [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
A. Avron, O. Arieli, A. Zamansky
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Weak consistency and strong paraconsistency
In a standard sense, consistency and paraconsistency are understood as, respectively, the absence of any contradiction and as the absence of the ECQ (“E contradictione quodlibet”) rule that allows us to conclude any well formed formula from any ...
Gemma Robles
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Kripke-Style Models for Logics of Evidence and Truth
In this paper, we propose Kripke-style models for the logics of evidence and truth LETJ and LETF. These logics extend, respectively, Nelson’s logic N4 and the logic of first-degree entailment (FDE) with a classicality operator ∘ that recovers classical ...
Henrique Antunes +3 more
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