Results 151 to 160 of about 247 (182)
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2003
According to the standard definition, a logic is said to be paraconsistent if it fails the (so-called) rule of ex falso: i.e., α, ¬α ∀ β. Thus, paraconsistency captures an important sense in which a logic is inconsistency-tolerant, namely when arbitrary inference is prohibited in the presence of inconsistencies.
Philippe Besnard, Paul Wong
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According to the standard definition, a logic is said to be paraconsistent if it fails the (so-called) rule of ex falso: i.e., α, ¬α ∀ β. Thus, paraconsistency captures an important sense in which a logic is inconsistency-tolerant, namely when arbitrary inference is prohibited in the presence of inconsistencies.
Philippe Besnard, Paul Wong
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A Hierarchy of Classical and Paraconsistent Logics
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2019There is a consensual agreement in abstract logic that a logic is a pair of objects (in most times logicians accept, in the Tarskian tradition, that a consequence relation is defined between sets of formulas and formulas). To determine whether two logics are, or at least can be viewed as, identicals is a typical inquiry, usually, in the domains of ...
Eduardo Alejandro Barrio +2 more
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Logical Weak Completions of Paraconsistent Logics
Journal of Logic and Computation, 2008Let P be an arbitrary theory and let X be any given logic. Let M be a set of atoms. We say that M is a X-stable model of P if M is a classical model of P and P∪¬M~ proves in logic X all atoms in M, this is denoted by P∪¬M~ ⊩xM. We prove that being an X-stable model is an invariant property for disjunctive programmes under a large class of logics.
Mauricio Javier Osorio Galindo +2 more
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A reasoning method for a paraconsistent logic
Studia Logica, 1993The recognition of the importance of paraconsistency for the study of the problem of modelling and automatizing the reasoning required to produce a glimmer of intelligent behavior on machines appeared in several previous works of the authors. This paper presents a proof method for automation of reasoning in the known paraconsistent predicate calculus \(
Arthur Buchsbaum, Tarcisio H. C. Pequeno
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Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1995
\textit{G. Priest} [``The logic of paradox'', J. Philos. Logic 8, 219-241 (1979; Zbl 0402.03012)] presents a paraconsistent logic, that is, one which does not collapse into all statements being provable but in which nevertheless ``\(A\vee \neg A\)'' is logically true and ``\(A \wedge\neg A\)'' is logically false. But, argues Slater in the present paper,
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\textit{G. Priest} [``The logic of paradox'', J. Philos. Logic 8, 219-241 (1979; Zbl 0402.03012)] presents a paraconsistent logic, that is, one which does not collapse into all statements being provable but in which nevertheless ``\(A\vee \neg A\)'' is logically true and ``\(A \wedge\neg A\)'' is logically false. But, argues Slater in the present paper,
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Paraconsistent Logic, Evidence, and Justification
Studia Logica, 2017zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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A paraconsistent extension of Sylvan’s logic
Algebra and Logic, 2007Summary: We deal with Sylvan's logic \(CC_\omega\). It is proved that this logic is a conservative extension of positive intuitionistic logic. Moreover, a paraconsistent extension of Sylvan's logic is constructed, which is also a conservative extension of positive intuitionistic logic and has the property of being decidable.
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Making Sense of Paraconsistent Logic: The Nature of Logic, Classical Logic and Paraconsistent Logic
2012Max Cresswell and Hilary Putnam seem to hold the view, often shared by classical logicians, that paraconsistent logic has not been made sense of, despite its well-developed mathematics. In this paper, I examine the nature of logic in order to understand what it means to make sense of logic.
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A Paraconsistent and Substructural Conditional Logic
2012I introduce and motivate a conditional logic based on the substructural system HL from Paoli (Substructural logics: a primer, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2002). Its hallmark is the presence of three logical levels (each one of which contains its own conditional connective), linked to one another by means of appropriate distribution principles.
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