Results 141 to 150 of about 812 (177)
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Aspects of Paraconsistent Logic
Logic Journal of IGPL, 1995This paper discusses an extension \(C^+_1\) of da Costa's system \(C_1\) of paraconsistent logic. A Hilbert-style version and a sequent calculus version of the system are presented as well as a bivalent non-truth-functional semantics. It is shown that \(C^+_1\) is semantically decidable, but that the replacement theorem does not hold.
Newton C. A. da Costa +2 more
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A Paraconsistent Conditional Logic
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2019zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Minghui Ma, Chun-Ting Wong
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Paraconsistent Logics and Translations
Synthese, 2000zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
D'Ottaviano, Itala M. Loffredo +1 more
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On Strong Maximality of Paraconsistent Finite-Valued Logics
, 2010 -Maximality is a desirable property of paraconsistent logics, motivated by the aspiration to tolerate inconsistencies, but at the same time retain as much as possible from classical logic.
Arnon Avron +2 more
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Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2015
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Paraconsistency in classical logic
Synthese, 2017zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Gabriele Pulcini, Achille C. Varzi
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2002
A logic is paraconsistent if it does not validate the principle that from a pair of contradictory sentences, A and ∼A, everything follows, as most orthodox logics do. If a theory has a paraconsistent underlying logic, it may be inconsistent without being trivial (that is, entailing everything).
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A logic is paraconsistent if it does not validate the principle that from a pair of contradictory sentences, A and ∼A, everything follows, as most orthodox logics do. If a theory has a paraconsistent underlying logic, it may be inconsistent without being trivial (that is, entailing everything).
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Paraconsistent Logical Consequence
Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 1998ABSTRACT The concept of paraconsistent logical consequence is usually negatively defined as a validity semantics in which not every sentences is deducible or in which inferential explosion does not occur. Paraconsistency has been negatively characterized in this way because paraconsistent logics have been designed specifically to avoid the ...
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2002
We propose a framework which extends Antitonic Logic Programs [2] to an arbitrary complete bilattice of truth-values, where belief and doubt are explicitly represented. Based on Fitting's ideas, this framework allows a precise definition of important operators found in logic programming such as explicit negation and the default negation. In particular,
João F. L. Alcântara +2 more
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We propose a framework which extends Antitonic Logic Programs [2] to an arbitrary complete bilattice of truth-values, where belief and doubt are explicitly represented. Based on Fitting's ideas, this framework allows a precise definition of important operators found in logic programming such as explicit negation and the default negation. In particular,
João F. L. Alcântara +2 more
openaire +1 more source