Results 101 to 110 of about 1,609,225 (232)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT It is generally assumed that an ordinary human brain is associated with a single mind. Indeed, this assumption is so deeply rooted that it is rarely articulated explicitly, let alone questioned. However, as philosophers of mind have increasingly noticed, it turns out to rest on alarmingly shaky ground.
James H. McIntyre
wiley +1 more source
How Seriously Should We Take AI Welfare? Constraints From the Epistemology of Consciousness
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Some philosophers argue that near‐term artificial intelligence (AI) systems might soon be welfare subjects. We should take AI welfare seriously, they urge, because AI systems might soon have properties indicated by our best scientific theories of consciousness, and consciousness suffices for welfare subjectivity.
Preston Lennon
wiley +1 more source
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT In this essay, I present a theory of attunement, the agent's readiness to attend to a target. I focus on attunement to reasons for action, and in particular, on sensitivity to moral reasons. After noting that many claims regarding moral perception are better construed as claims regarding moral attention, I separate perceptual from attentional ...
Wayne Wu
wiley +1 more source
The Problem of Psychonomic Harmony
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT The problem of nomological harmony is the problem of explaining why the laws of nature match or apply to the states of the universe in a way that results in temporal evolution. The problem of psychophysical harmony is the problem of explaining why phenomenal states are paired with physical states and other phenomenal states in surprisingly ...
Joseph C. Schmid
wiley +1 more source
SELFHOOD AT THE FRAGILE BORDER OF (AB)NORMALITY
Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Philosophia, 2016 Selfhood at the Fragile Border of (Ab)normality. We will attempt to briefly examine the phenomenological aspects of the ontic and ontological appearance of normal selfhood and psychopathological manifestations.
Attila KOVÁCS
doaj
Ratio, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Most naïve realists do not distinguish between perception and consciousness; to say that I perceive the table is akin to saying that I am conscious of the table. Doing so leads many to maintain that if the character of experience is constituted by anything other than the table, I do not perceive it, and so naïve realism fails.
R. P. Koutedakis
wiley +1 more source
The Dynamic Block Universe: Change Independent of Passage
Ratio, EarlyView.ABSTRACT The world appears to be in a constant state of flux, with objects changing and events unfolding over time. I refer to this characterisation as the Manifest Dynamic World. I have argued elsewhere that the Manifest Dynamic World involves two fundamentally distinct kinds of dynamism that cannot be reduced to one another: the dynamic character of ...
Jean Campos
wiley +1 more source
Ratio, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Descartes' cogito argument is perhaps the most well‐known philosophical argument, the conclusion of which is supposed to be a form of rationalism that allows for contingent a priori knowledge of the world. In this short note, I argue that, in fact, the all important statement, ‘I am, I exist’, should be analysed through the lens of (classical)
Tom Schoonen
wiley +1 more source
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.Abstract This article reinterprets Levinas's account of ethical subjectivity by centering the temporality of the pas encore (“not yet”) and drawing on new materials in Œuvres complètes. I argue that, in Totality and Infinity, eros and ethics are internally continuous: eros generates a responsible not yet of time, secured by fecundity and oriented to ...
Huaiyuan Zhang
wiley +1 more source
Understanding and truth in Hannah Arendt: The critical reception of the Eichmann trial and the will
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.Abstract This article highlights a shift in Hannah Arendt's intellectual development regarding the will during the 1960s, traced into the early 1970s when she focused on thinking, willing, and judging. I argue that this change was driven by reactions to her report on Adolf Eichmann's 1961 trial in Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963).
Andrew Song
wiley +1 more source