Results 111 to 120 of about 1,066,818 (247)
Phenomenal character (or feel) is the what-it's-likeness of subjective experience. I develop an ontology of phenomenal feel as process. My being in some phenomenal state R is the process of my instantiating R’s neurological correlate.
L.A. Paul, Paul, L. A.
core +1 more source
Hitting and missing on consciousness
Disturbances of conscious experience are central features of many psychiatric and mental health disorders. Experimental studies of conscious perception are therefore increasingly cited in clinical and translational work under the assumption that they identify neural mechanisms specific to subjective experience.
Tomoya Nakamura +2 more
wiley +1 more source
AI Alignment Versus AI Ethical Treatment: 10 Challenges
ABSTRACT A morally acceptable course of AI development should avoid two dangers: creating unaligned AI systems that pose a threat to humanity and mistreating AI systems that merit moral consideration in their own right. This paper argues these two dangers interact and that if we create AI systems that merit moral consideration, simultaneously avoiding ...
Adam Bradley, Bradford Saad
wiley +1 more source
DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxi1.05 The paper discusses possible roles of consciousness in a semiotic (meaning-making) activity of a cognitive agent.
Piotr Konderak
doaj
Contingent Grounding Physicalism
ABSTRACT It is widely held that physicalism is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of zombies, i.e., beings physically just like us yet lacking in phenomenal consciousness. The present paper argues that this orthodoxy is mistaken. As against the received wisdom, physicalism is perfectly compatible with the possibility of zombies and zombie ...
Alex Moran
wiley +1 more source
Dogmatism and Easy Knowledge: Avoiding the Dialectic?
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes and objects to the anti‐skeptical strategy endorsed by Epistemological Dogmatism. Dogmatism is a theory of epistemic justification that holds perceptual warrant for our beliefs is immediate, based on experiential seemings. Crucially, it rejects requests for higher‐order justification or active defense of the justification ...
Guido Tana
wiley +1 more source
ABSTRACT I develop and defend a sense‐datum theory of perception. My theory follows the spirit of classic sense‐datum theories: I argue that what it is to have a perceptual experience is to be acquainted with some sense‐data, where sense‐data are private particulars that have all the properties they appear to have, that are common to both perception ...
Andrew Y. Lee
wiley +1 more source
Is Having a Pain Having an Unshareable Particular?
ABSTRACT Do I have something no one else can have when I am in pain? This puzzle about the so‐called ‘privacy of ownership’ of sensations is a special case of the problem of whether the states and qualities of a subject are particulars. (For if someone ‘has’ a pain, then that someone ‘is in’ a pain state and vice versa.) The debate addressing the ...
Bernhard Ritter
wiley +1 more source
ABSTRACT In this essay, I present a theory of attunement, the agent's readiness to attend to a target. I focus on attunement to reasons for action, and in particular, on sensitivity to moral reasons. After noting that many claims regarding moral perception are better construed as claims regarding moral attention, I separate perceptual from attentional ...
Wayne Wu
wiley +1 more source

