Results 181 to 190 of about 1,609,225 (232)

The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness: Prospects for a Phenomenal Character-based Account

Philosophia (United States)
Alberto Barbieri
exaly   +3 more sources

Phenomenal character and the epistemic role of perception

SynthÈse
Carlo Raineri
exaly   +3 more sources

The fragmentation of phenomenal character

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2021
AbstractIn this paper, I argue that debates over “phenomenal character” have suffered from fragmentation: philosophers who use the term have had in mind at least three (and probably more) radically different kinds of properties. This has occurred because the expression “what it’s like” exhibits a particularly deep form of context‐sensitivity, and when ...
Neil Mehta
openaire   +2 more sources

Phenomenal character, phenomenal concepts, and externalism

Philosophical Studies, 2008
A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible.
Jonathan Ellis
exaly   +2 more sources

Galileo and the Phenomenal Character of Experience

Philosophy
Abstract Historians of philosophy widely concur that Galileo Galilei (re)introduced the metaphysical dichotomy of primary and secondary properties into philosophical discourse. However, his conceptual distinction appeared muddled, resulting in frequent misinterpretations or disregard over time.
János Laki
openaire   +2 more sources

Subjective Character as the Origo a Quo of Phenomenal Consciousness

Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2021
Abstract This article contributes to the debate on self-consciousness, inner awareness, and subjective character. Philosophers puzzle over whether subjective character has a monadic or a relational form. But the present article deploys formal ontology to show that this is a false dichotomy.
Kyle Banick
openaire   +2 more sources

Why Intentionalism Cannot Explain Phenomenal Character

Erkenntnis, 2018
I argue that intentionalist theories of perceptual experience are unable to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. I begin by describing what is involved in explaining phenomenal character, and why it is a task of philosophical theories of perceptual experience to explain it.
Harold Langsam
semanticscholar   +3 more sources

Phenomenal Character Revisited

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2000
I am grateful to Michael Tye for his discussion of my book, and to the editor for offering me the opportunity to respond to Tye's criticisms of my account of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience-especially since this prompted reflections that led me to see a way of removing one unattractive feature of the account.
S. Shoemaker
openaire   +2 more sources

Reduction and the determination of phenomenal character

Philosophical Psychology, 2011
A central task of philosophy of mind in recent decades has been to come up with a comprehensive account of the mind that is consistent with materialism. To this end, philosophers have offered useful reductive accounts of mentality in terms that are ultimately explainable by neurobiology.
Jennifer Matey
openaire   +2 more sources

ASPECT-SWITCHING AND VISUAL PHENOMENAL CHARACTER

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2009
John Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect-switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I respond that cases of aspect-switching can be explained without holding that visual experience represents rich properties.
Richard N. Price
openaire   +2 more sources