Results 201 to 210 of about 1,066,818 (247)
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Naïve Realism and the Relationality of Phenomenal Character
Topoi, 2023Roberta Locatelli
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What Constitutes Phenomenal Character? [PDF]
[This is the penultimate version.] Reductive strong representationalists accept the Common Kind Thesis about subjectively indistinguishable sensory hallucinations, illusions, and veridical experiences.
Aydede, Murat
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The fragmentation of phenomenal character
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2021AbstractIn this paper, I argue that debates over “phenomenal character” have suffered from fragmentation: philosophers who use the term have had in mind at least three (and probably more) radically different kinds of properties. This has occurred because the expression “what it’s like” exhibits a particularly deep form of context‐sensitivity, and when ...
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Phenomenal character and the epistemic role of perception
SynthÈseCarlo Raineri
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Phenomenal Character Revisited
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2000I am grateful to Michael Tye for his discussion of my book, and to the editor for offering me the opportunity to respond to Tye's criticisms of my account of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience-especially since this prompted reflections that led me to see a way of removing one unattractive feature of the account.
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Phenomenal Character and the Myth of the Given
Journal of Philosophical Research, 2006In "Sellars and the 'Myth of the Given,'" Alston argues against Sellars's position in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (EPM) that there is no nonconceptual cognition. According to him, Sellars ignores phenomenal look-concepts that capture the phenomenal character of experience.
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The Phenomenal Character of Seeing
1997Abstract Although chapter 4 addressed the question of the logical form of visual content, I have assiduously avoided, wherever possible, implicating myself in further ques tions about visual consciousness. But in earlier discussions, it was stressed that vision is phenomenal, hardly a claim to let pass without comment.
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Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character
Dialogue, 2005ABSTRACTThis article defends two theses: that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has phenomenal character, i.e., if and only if there is something it is like for the subject to be in that state, and that all state consciousness involves selfconsciousness, in the sense that a mental state is conscious if and only if its possessor is, in some ...
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