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Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character
Dialogue, 2005ABSTRACTThis article defends two theses: that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has phenomenal character, i.e., if and only if there is something it is like for the subject to be in that state, and that all state consciousness involves selfconsciousness, in the sense that a mental state is conscious if and only if its possessor is, in some ...
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ASPECT-SWITCHING AND VISUAL PHENOMENAL CHARACTER
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2009John Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect-switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I respond that cases of aspect-switching can be explained without holding that visual experience represents rich properties.
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On Phenomenal Character and Petri Dishes
Journal of Philosophical Research, 2014Michael Tye (2007) argues that phenomenal character cannot be an intrinsic microphysical property of experiences (or be necessitated by intrinsic microphysical properties) because this would entail that experience could occur in a chunk of tissue in a Petri dish.
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Subjective Character as the Origo a Quo of Phenomenal Consciousness
Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2021Abstract This article contributes to the debate on self-consciousness, inner awareness, and subjective character. Philosophers puzzle over whether subjective character has a monadic or a relational form. But the present article deploys formal ontology to show that this is a false dichotomy.
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Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2016It’s a familiar fact that there is something it is like to see red, eat chocolate or feel pain. More recently philosophers have insisted that in addition to this objectual phenomenology there is something it is like for me to eat chocolate, and this for-me-ness is no less there than the chocolatishness.
Robert J. Howell, Brad Thompson
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Reduction and the determination of phenomenal character
Philosophical Psychology, 2011A central task of philosophy of mind in recent decades has been to come up with a comprehensive account of the mind that is consistent with materialism. To this end, philosophers have offered useful reductive accounts of mentality in terms that are ultimately explainable by neurobiology.
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The Phenomenal Character of Seeing
1997Abstract Although chapter 4 addressed the question of the logical form of visual content, I have assiduously avoided, wherever possible, implicating myself in further ques tions about visual consciousness. But in earlier discussions, it was stressed that vision is phenomenal, hardly a claim to let pass without comment.
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Arguments About Phenomenal Character
The phenomenal character of an experience is what it is like to have it. This dissertation investigates the nature of phenomenal character, with a focus on the character of experiences of a certain sort: perceptual experiences. Most theorists agree that perceptual phenomenal character involves the presentation of various things or “contents,” but they ...openaire +1 more source
Quantitative Character and the Composite Account of Phenomenal Content
2022I advance an account of quantitative character, a species of phenomenal character that presents as an intensity (cf. a quality) and includes experience dimensions such as loudness, pain intensity, and visual pop-out. I employ psychological and neuroscientific evidence to demonstrate that quantitative characters are best explained by attentional ...
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