Results 211 to 220 of about 1,066,818 (247)
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On Phenomenal Character and Petri Dishes

Journal of Philosophical Research, 2014
Michael Tye (2007) argues that phenomenal character cannot be an intrinsic microphysical property of experiences (or be necessitated by intrinsic microphysical properties) because this would entail that experience could occur in a chunk of tissue in a Petri dish.
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Reduction and the determination of phenomenal character

Philosophical Psychology, 2011
A central task of philosophy of mind in recent decades has been to come up with a comprehensive account of the mind that is consistent with materialism. To this end, philosophers have offered useful reductive accounts of mentality in terms that are ultimately explainable by neurobiology.
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Subjective Character as the Origo a Quo of Phenomenal Consciousness

Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2021
Abstract This article contributes to the debate on self-consciousness, inner awareness, and subjective character. Philosophers puzzle over whether subjective character has a monadic or a relational form. But the present article deploys formal ontology to show that this is a false dichotomy.
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The Phenomenal Character of Consciousness

Abstract This chapter focuses on phenomenal consciousness. The starting assumption is Nagel’s observation that consciousness, in particular the phenomenal appearances that accompany conscious mental states, are only there from the perspective of the relevant subject and are somehow involved in the subject’s being a perspective on the ...
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A Representational Theory of Pains and their Phenomenal Character

Philosophical Perspectives, 1995
The fundamental assumption of cognitive psychology is that the cognitive mind is a representational system which mediates between sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. The primary task for the cognitive psychologist is one of explaining how the various cognitive capacities operate by reference to the structure of the salient parts of this ...
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ASPECT-SWITCHING AND VISUAL PHENOMENAL CHARACTER

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2009
John Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect-switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I respond that cases of aspect-switching can be explained without holding that visual experience represents rich properties.
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Quantitative Character and the Composite Account of Phenomenal Content

2022
I advance an account of quantitative character, a species of phenomenal character that presents as an intensity (cf. a quality) and includes experience dimensions such as loudness, pain intensity, and visual pop-out. I employ psychological and neuroscientific evidence to demonstrate that quantitative characters are best explained by attentional ...
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Galileo and the Phenomenal Character of Experience

Philosophy
Abstract Historians of philosophy widely concur that Galileo Galilei (re)introduced the metaphysical dichotomy of primary and secondary properties into philosophical discourse. However, his conceptual distinction appeared muddled, resulting in frequent misinterpretations or disregard over time.
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Why Intentionalism Cannot Explain Phenomenal Character

Erkenntnis, 2018
I argue that intentionalist theories of perceptual experience are unable to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. I begin by describing what is involved in explaining phenomenal character, and why it is a task of philosophical theories of perceptual experience to explain it.
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Arguments About Phenomenal Character

The phenomenal character of an experience is what it is like to have it. This dissertation investigates the nature of phenomenal character, with a focus on the character of experiences of a certain sort: perceptual experiences. Most theorists agree that perceptual phenomenal character involves the presentation of various things or “contents,” but they ...
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