Results 211 to 220 of about 99,481 (259)

Affordances and Phenomenal Character in Spatial Perception

Philosophical Review, 2011
According to intentionalism the phenomenal character (“what it’s like”) of a conscious experience is determined wholly by its representational content. In its strongest forms intentionalism offers the tantalizing prospect of a reduction of phenomenal character to representational content. Arguments based on Twin Earth-like scenarios have shown, however,
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Why Intentionalism Cannot Explain Phenomenal Character

Erkenntnis, 2018
I argue that intentionalist theories of perceptual experience are unable to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. I begin by describing what is involved in explaining phenomenal character, and why it is a task of philosophical theories of perceptual experience to explain it.
Harold Langsam
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The representational theory of phenomenal character: A phenomenological critique

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2006
According to a currently popular approach to the analysis of phenomenal character mandates that the phenomenal character of an experience is entirely determined by, and is in fact identical with, the experience’s representational content. Two underlying assumptions motivate this approach to phenomenal character: (1) that conscious experiences are ...
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A Representational Theory of Pains and their Phenomenal Character

Philosophical Perspectives, 1995
The fundamental assumption of cognitive psychology is that the cognitive mind is a representational system which mediates between sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. The primary task for the cognitive psychologist is one of explaining how the various cognitive capacities operate by reference to the structure of the salient parts of this ...
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Phenomenal Character

Noûs, 1994
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Defending internalism about unconscious phenomenal character

Synthese
Tomáš Marvan, Sam Coleman
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The fragmentation of phenomenal character

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2021
AbstractIn this paper, I argue that debates over “phenomenal character” have suffered from fragmentation: philosophers who use the term have had in mind at least three (and probably more) radically different kinds of properties. This has occurred because the expression “what it’s like” exhibits a particularly deep form of context‐sensitivity, and when ...
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Privileged Access, Phenomenal Character, and Externalism

2008
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Phenomenal Character Revisited

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2000
I am grateful to Michael Tye for his discussion of my book, and to the editor for offering me the opportunity to respond to Tye's criticisms of my account of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience-especially since this prompted reflections that led me to see a way of removing one unattractive feature of the account.
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Phenomenal character and the epistemic role of perception

Synthese
Carlo Raineri
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