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Metaphysics of quantity and the limit of phenomenal concepts [PDF]
, 2019 Quantities like mass and temperature are properties that come in degrees. And those degrees (e.g. 5 kg) are properties that are called the magnitudes of the quantities.
Derek Lam
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Do phenomenal concepts misrepresent? [PDF]
Philosophical Psychology, 2016 AbstractMany contemporary physicalists concede to dualists that conscious subjects have distinctive “phenomenal concepts” of the phenomenal qualities of their experiences. Indeed, they contend that idiosyncratic characteristics of these concepts facilitate responses to influential anti-physicalist arguments.
Darragh Byrne
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Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism without Phenomenal Concepts [PDF]
, 2011 The novel approach presented in this paper accounts for the occurrence of the epistemic gap and defends physicalism against anti-physicalist arguments without relying on so-called phenomenal concepts.
P. Fazekas
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Are Phenomenal Concepts Perspectival? [PDF]
Southwest Philosophy Review, 2012 1. Are phenomenal concepts perspectival? That is to say, is it the case that a subject can possess or acquire a phenomenal concept only if the subject has previously experienced that to which the concept refers? In this essay, I have a two-fold objective.
Andreas Elpidorou
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Infallibility, Acquaintance, and Phenomenal Concepts
Dialectica, 2016 In recent literature, there is a strong tendency to endorse the following argument: There are particular judgments about one's current phenomenal experiences that are infallible; if there are particular judgments about one's current phenomenal experiences that are infallible, then the infallibility of those judgments is due to the relation of ...
W. Barz
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Phenomenal Concepts as Complex Demonstratives [PDF]
Res Philosophica, 2021 Nathan Robert Howard, N. G. Laskowski
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There Are No Phenomenal Concepts [PDF]
Mind, 2009 It has long been widely agreed that some concepts can be possessed only by those who have undergone a certain type of phenomenal experience. Orthodoxy among contemporary philosophers of mind has it that these phenomenal concepts provide the key to understanding many disputes between physicalists and their opponents, and in particular offer an ...
Derek Ball
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Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts [PDF]
The Knowledge Argument, 2019 D. Pitt
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Phenomenal Consciousness; a Challenge to Physicalism [PDF]
Journal of Philosophical Investigations, 2021 The undeniable success of neuroscience in explaining human mental states, which in the past were explained in terms of supernatural concepts, has led many modern-day scientists and philosophers to advocate physicalist methods in explaining human nature ...
Samad Hosseini, Abbas Yazdani
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Problemos, 2023 In this paper, I present a novel objection to Chalmers’s “master argument” against the privileged strategy of ‘type B’ physicalists to account for the explanatory gap (the “phenomenal concepts strategy”).
Luis Alejandro Murillo-Lara
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