Results 11 to 20 of about 4,508,703 (295)

Does the Conceivability of Zombies Entail Their Possibility? [PDF]

open access: yesOrganon F, 2020
According to the two-dimensional argument against materialism, developed by David Chalmers, the conceivability of zombies entails primary possibility, and the primary possibility of zombies entails further secondary possibility.
Karol Polcyn
doaj   +1 more source

Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong

open access: yesPhilosophical Studies, 2023
Russellian physicalism is becoming increasingly popular because it promises to deliver what everybody wants, realism and physicalism about consciousness. But Russellian physicalists are not the first to swear on “the promise”, standard Type-B physicalism
Marcelino Botin
semanticscholar   +1 more source

The Epistemic Value of Music [PDF]

open access: yesOrganon F, 2021
Assuming that music can be expressive, I try to answer the question whether musical expressiveness has epistemic value. The article has six parts. In the first part, I provide examples of what music can express. I suggest that it can express inner states
Marina Bakalova
doaj   +1 more source

What could the phenomenal identity be? Considerations on the basis of retrospective description of my own research and analyses of the concepts of philosophy

open access: yesPodstawy Edukacji, 2022
The text is a re-examination of the reflections that result from theoretical analyses of my earlier research. They concerned metaphorical thinking, seeing and constructing visual analogies and the critical thinking of an allegorist using irony.
Małgorzata Muszyńska
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Two Kinds of Introspection [PDF]

open access: yes, 2022
One of David Rosenthal’s many important contributions to the philosophy of mind was his clear and unshirking account of introspection. Here we argue that while there is a kind of introspection (we call it “reflective introspection”) that Rosenthal’s ...
Giustina, Anna, Kriegel, Uriah
core   +1 more source

Typical errors in presenting concepts in textbooks for the first four grades of primary school [PDF]

open access: yesNastava i Vaspitanje, 2021
This paper offers a systematization of typical errors in presenting scientific concepts in textbooks for the first four grades of primary school. The subject of our analysis and systematization were presentations of concepts which deviate from or violate
Petrović Vesna, Antić Slobodanka
doaj   +1 more source

Physicalism and the nature of phenomenal concepts

open access: yesRevista de Filosofia, 2010
In recent years, a number of authors have tried to respond to Frank Jackson’s so-called “Knowledge Argument” against physicalism by appealing to phenomenal concepts, that is, concepts under which fall the phenomenal aspect of our experiences, or, to put ...
André Joffily Abath
doaj   +1 more source

The explanatory gap problem and Papineau’s phenomenal concepts strategy

open access: yes, 2020
The main purpose of this article is to analyze David Papineau?s influential perceptual model of phenomenal concepts in order to respond to the explanatory gap problem.
Sanela Ristic-Rankovic
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Materializm Typu-B i Treść Pojęć Fenomenalnych (Type-B Materialism and the Content of Phenomenal Concepts)

open access: yesAnaliza i Egzystencja, 2019
According to type-B materialism, the corresponding phenomenal and physical concepts are distinct concepts of the same properties. This view is very controversial because of the fact that phenomenal concepts, along with physical concepts, refer non ...
Karol Polcyn
doaj   +1 more source

The problem of consciousness: an assessment of Michael Tye’s and David Chalmers’ criticisms of the phenomenal concept strategy

open access: yesInkanyiso, 2017
This paper presents a critical assessment of Michael Tye’s and David Chalmers’ criticisms of the phenomenal concept strategy. The assessment is done with a view to defend the phenomenal concept strategy against Tye’s and Chalmers’ arguments.
Adeyanju O. Muideen
doaj   +1 more source

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