Results 81 to 90 of about 70,610 (286)

Phenomenal Knowledge without Phenomenal Concepts? On Jesse Prinz’ Theory of Mental Pointers

Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento, 2011
The aim of the present paper is to present and criticize the reply of Jesse Prinz (2007) to the “knowledge argument” proposed by Jackson (1982). Prinz’ proposal relies on two tenets: in the first place, it is supported by an original neurocognitive ...
Barberis, Sergio Daniel
doaj  

Phenomenology without conscious access is a form of consciousness without top-down attention [PDF]

, 2007
We agree with Block's basic hypothesis postulating the existence of phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access. We explain such states in terms of consciousness without top-down, endogenous attention and speculate that their correlates may be a ...
Koch, Christof, Tsuchiya, Naotsugu
core   +1 more source

Visual Perspectives in Episodic Memory and the Sense of Self

Frontiers in Psychology, 2018
The connection between memory and self-consciousness has been a central topic in philosophy of memory. When remembering an event we experienced in the past, not only do we experience being the subject of the conscious episode, but we also experience ...
Ying-Tung Lin
doaj   +1 more source

Consciousness and Causal Emergence: Śāntarakṣita Against Physicalism [PDF]

, 2017
In challenging the physicalist conception of consciousness advanced by Cārvāka materialists such as Bṛhaspati, the Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita addresses a series of key issues about the nature of causality and the basis of cognition.
Coseru, Christian
core  

Consciousness in non-epileptic attack disorder [PDF]

, 2011
Non-epileptic attack disorder (NEAD) is one of the most important differential diagnoses of epilepsy. Impairment of consciousness is the key feature of non-epileptic attacks (NEAs).
Kurthen, M., Reuber, M.
core   +1 more source

Language comprehension and the rhythm of perception

Mind &Language, EarlyView.
It is widely agreed that language understanding has a distinctive phenomenology, as illustrated by phenomenal contrast cases. Yet it remains unclear how to account for the perceptual phenomenology of language experience. I advance a rhythmic account, which explains this phenomenology in terms of changes in the rhythm of sensory capacities in both ...
Alfredo Vernazzani
wiley   +1 more source

Is the Mind a Magic Trick? Illusionism about Consciousness in the “Consciousness-Only” Theory of Vasubandhu and Sthiramati

Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
Illusionists about consciousness boldly argue that phenomenal consciousness does not fundamentally exist—it only seems to exist. For them, the impression of having a private inner life of conscious qualia is nothing more than a cognitive error, a ...
Amit Chaturvedi
doaj   +2 more sources

Facing Up to David Chalmers’ Philosophy of Mind: the General Overview [PDF]

, 2017
According to Tim Crane, “the ’hard problem’ of consciousness is supposed to be the real heart of the mind-body problem in today’s philosophy”. The idea of the problem can be expressed in the following way: Why are the physical processes in our brain ...
Leonov, Andrii
core  

Slow switching and the psychology of memory

Mind &Language, EarlyView.
This article presents elements of a theory of the representational contents of episodic memory and a new perspective on the relationship between memory and self‐knowledge. These two interrelated outcomes fall out of a novel naturalistic treatment of the debate concerning the compatibility between semantic externalism and a priori self‐knowledge.
Jay Richardson
wiley   +1 more source

How-tests for consciousness and direct neurophenomenal structuralism

Frontiers in Psychology
Despite recent criticism, the search for neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) is still at the core of a contemporary neuroscience of consciousness.
Sascha Benjamin Fink, Sascha Benjamin Fink   +1 more
doaj   +1 more source