Results 91 to 100 of about 2,631 (210)

Brentano on phenomenal and transitive consciousness, unconscious consciousness, and phenomenal intentionality [PDF]

European Journal of Philosophy, 2021
openaire   +1 more source

Dogmatism and Easy Knowledge: Avoiding the Dialectic?

Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes and objects to the anti‐skeptical strategy endorsed by Epistemological Dogmatism. Dogmatism is a theory of epistemic justification that holds perceptual warrant for our beliefs is immediate, based on experiential seemings. Crucially, it rejects requests for higher‐order justification or active defense of the justification ...
Guido Tana
wiley   +1 more source

The hidden structure of consciousness

Frontiers in Psychology
According to Loorits, if we want consciousness to be explained in terms of natural sciences, we should be able to analyze its seemingly non-structural aspects, like qualia, in structural terms.
Bruno Forti
doaj   +1 more source

A Theory of Sense‐Data

Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT I develop and defend a sense‐datum theory of perception. My theory follows the spirit of classic sense‐datum theories: I argue that what it is to have a perceptual experience is to be acquainted with some sense‐data, where sense‐data are private particulars that have all the properties they appear to have, that are common to both perception ...
Andrew Y. Lee
wiley   +1 more source

The Neural Correlates of Access Consciousness and Phenomenal Consciousness Seem to Coincide and Would Correspond to a Memory Center, an Activation Center and Eight Parallel Convergence Centers. [PDF]

Front Psychol, 2021
Frigato G.
europepmc   +1 more source

Experience and Time: A Metaphysical Approach

Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? While it is popular to think that our most basic conscious experiences are temporally extended, we will be arguing against this view, on the grounds that it makes our conscious experiences depend on the future in an implausible way.
David Builes, Michele Odisseas Impagnatiello   +1 more
wiley   +1 more source

Is Having a Pain Having an Unshareable Particular?

Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Do I have something no one else can have when I am in pain? This puzzle about the so‐called ‘privacy of ownership’ of sensations is a special case of the problem of whether the states and qualities of a subject are particulars. (For if someone ‘has’ a pain, then that someone ‘is in’ a pain state and vice versa.) The debate addressing the ...
Bernhard Ritter
wiley   +1 more source

Świadomość fenomenalna a problem intencjonalności. O intencjonalności fenomalnej (Phenomenal Consciousness and the Problem of Intentionality. About Phenomenal Intentionality) [PDF]

Analiza i Egzystencja, 2011
The article concerns the problem of how to understand the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality or mental content – an issue that, until recently, has been neglected by many analytic philosophers of mind. I distinguish two ways
Paweł Gładziejewski
doaj  

Powers That Be: An Adventure in Metaphysics

Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper is an investigation into the increasingly popular trend amongst philosophers on the metaphysics of powers, exemplified by the statement: ‘To be real is to possess a power to affect (or to be affected by) other things’. First, I briefly trace the history of this idea (from the Eleatic dialectic of ancient times to present day quantum
David Rozema
wiley   +1 more source

The philosophy of phenomenal consciousness [PDF]

, 2015
The scientific study of consciousness is constantly making new discoveries, but one particular aspect of consciousness remains problematic to explain. This is the fact that conscious experiences present themselves to us in a first-person way: there is something it feels like to be the subject of a conscious experience.
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