Results 241 to 250 of about 194,126 (342)
Do expected utility maximizers have commitment issues?
Abstract Critics have argued that expected utility theory fails as a theory of rational choice for diachronic agents who expect their preferences to change in response to temptations. According to this criticism, such agents cannot rationally commit to executing a sequence of actions, even when doing so would produce outcomes they consistently prefer ...
Paul de Font‐Reaulx
wiley +1 more source
A Phenomenological Understanding of Aging "Well" With Multiple Sclerosis. [PDF]
Richardson EV, Motl RW.
europepmc +1 more source
ABSTRACT What is the fear of missing out (FOMO)? I construe FOMO as a kind of fear which represents its object as absent and distinguish it from nearby phenomena such as regret and loneliness. This construal raises a tension. Philosophers understand fear as representing objects as dangerous, but it is less than clear how experiences of absence pose a ...
Rebecca Rowson
wiley +1 more source
The Generality of Normative Thought
ABSTRACT What is it to think a generic normative thought of the form “Human beings should exercise regularly” or “Human beings must keep promises”? I argue that although such thoughts resemble, in different respects, intentions and evaluative beliefs, they are not, first and foremost, either of those types of states.
Jeremy David Fix
wiley +1 more source
Qualia as query act, the phenomenology of predictive error coding. [PDF]
Harris HW.
europepmc +1 more source
Purely Instrumental Agents Are Possible
ABSTRACT Purely instrumental agents can reason about how to realize their ends, but not about which ends to pursue. They can do one thing in order to do another but cannot choose their final ends for reasons. Some have argued that such agents are impossible, and that the success of moral constitutivism depends on their impossibility.
Bennett Eckert‐Kuang
wiley +1 more source
Gustav Shpet’s Hermeneutic Phenomenology: On the Way to the Positive Philosophy of History
I V Demin
openalex +1 more source

