Results 261 to 270 of about 194,126 (342)

Beyond accommodation: on the structural turn in computational functionalist theories of consciousness. [PDF]

Neurosci Conscious
Ellia F, Tsuchiya N.
europepmc   +1 more source

On the Practical Necessity of the Categories

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Kant tells us that we cannot know whether all finite rational beings must share the same forms of sensibility. Can we know whether all finite rational beings must share the same forms of understanding? Recent discussion of this issue has focused on whether Kant thinks this can be decided from the theoretical point of view.
Anil Gomes, Andrew Stephenson
wiley   +1 more source

<i>Journal of Medical Ethics</i> at 50: a data-driven history. [PDF]

J Med Ethics
Dranseika V, Bystranowski P, Żuradzki T.   +2 more
europepmc   +1 more source

How to Think About Tacit (or Implicit) Beliefs

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper defends a novel theory of tacit belief (sometimes called “implicit belief”). After providing some background and taxonomy, I argue that dispositionalist theories of belief fail to provide a good account of tacit beliefs; this failure gives us a reason to reject those dispositionalist theories.
Andrew Moon
wiley   +1 more source

The Problem (and the Value) of Radical Moral Disagreement. [PDF]

Wellcome Open Res
Lyreskog D, Wilkinson D, A Atuire C, Farrell M, Francis E, Harrison M, Kingori P, Savulescu J, Singh I, Parker M.   +9 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences [PDF]

, 2010
openaire   +1 more source

Guessing at Ghosts in the Machine

Ratio, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT As AI grows ever more complex and ubiquitous, its moral status becomes increasingly pressing. But knowing whether an AI has moral status is only part of the ethical puzzle. To determine how we ought to treat such entities, we must know not only whether AIs have moral status, but also about the content of their interests—what contributes to ...
Helen Yetter‐Chappell
wiley   +1 more source

Toward a “strong” normativity of fear in Hans Jonas and Aristotle

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract What does it mean to say that one “ought” to undergo an emotion? In The Imperative of Responsibility, Hans Jonas provocatively asserts that twentieth‐century citizens “ought” to fear for the well‐being of future generations. I argue that Jonas's demand is not straightforwardly reducible to claims about the fittingness, expedience, or aretaic ...
Magnus Ferguson
wiley   +1 more source