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O BNDES nas visões de liberalismo e do republicanismo neorromano de Philip Pettit

open access: yesRevista do Direito Público, 2020
Esta pesquisa pretendeu analisar o comportamento do Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social, a partir de duas concepções doutrinárias que se destacam: o liberalismo e o republicanismo.
Déborah de Meira Málaque   +1 more
doaj   +1 more source

Estudio introductorio. La teoría republicana de Philip Pettit [PDF]

open access: yes, 2023
El neorepublicanismo comprende un amplio espectro de enfoques y concepciones en constante evolución. Para caracterizarlo podemos focalizarnos en una concepción o teoría y adoptarla como punto de referencia para luego indagar sobre las diferencias ...
Rekers, Romina
core   +1 more source

En defensa de un control republicano reflexivo de constitucionalidad. Un análisis comparativo de las propuestas de Tom Hickey y Richard Bellamy

open access: yesPerspectivas de las Ciencias Económicas y Jurídicas, 2023
Este trabajo se centra en el análisis de una institución política compleja y relevante: la revisión constitucional. En términos generales, se evalúa su legitimidad democrática desde una perspectiva filosófica normativa que coincide con un enfoque ...
Nicolás Emanuel Olivares
doaj  

The Objective Value of Childrearing

open access: yesPhilosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 54, Issue 2, Page 94-104, Spring 2026.
ABSTRACT Most countries legally recognize the right and duty to raise the child one has carried and given birth to, (i) reflecting a traditional legal presumption (despite widespread abuse and neglect) that parents should be granted wide‐ranging legal rights with respect to their minor children.
Danielle Levitan
wiley   +1 more source

Legitimidade democrática e Estado de Direito sob a perspectiva republicana de Philip Pettit [Democratic Legitimacy and the Rule of Law under the Republican perspective of Philip Pettit]

open access: yesPrincípios, 2018
A legitimidade política representa a relação adequada entre o Estado de Direito e os cidadãos. A ordem estatal expressa as suas determinações e sua exigência de obrigação por meio da legislação.
Alberto Paulo Neto
doaj   +1 more source

Reasons, Mistakes, and Excuses

open access: yesThe Modern Law Review, Volume 89, Issue 3, Page 439-466, May 2026.
Drawing on the theory of practical reasons, John Gardner has offered a seminal account of excuses in criminal law. His proposal is that an excuse asserts that the defendant acted for what she justifiably believed to be sufficient reason for her to perform the offending act although she had no such reason.
Andreas Vassiliou
wiley   +1 more source

Reply to commentators on When minds converse: A social genealogy of the human soul

open access: yesMind &Language, Volume 41, Issue 2, Page 307-313, April 2026.
This paper offers a brief overview of When minds converse followed by a characterization of each response and a consideration of some of the observations that it makes.
Philip Pettit
wiley   +1 more source

Hegel’s justification of the human right to non-domination [PDF]

open access: yesFilozofija i Društvo, 2017
‘Hegel’ and ‘human rights’ are rarely conjoined, and the designation ‘human rights’ appears rarely in his works. Indeed, Hegel has been criticised for omitting civil and political rights all together. My surmise is that readers have looked for a
Westphal Kenneth R.
doaj   +1 more source

The Globalized Republican Ideal

open access: yesGlobal justice: Theory, Practice, Rhetoric, 2016
The concept of freedom as non-domination that is associated with neo-republican theory provides a guiding ideal in the global, not just the domestic arena, and does so even on the assumption that there will continue to be many distinct states.
Philip Pettit
doaj   +1 more source

Criminal Law and Republican Liberty: Philip Pettit’s Account [PDF]

open access: yesCriminal Law and Philosophy, 2018
AbstractPhilip Pettit has made central to modern republican theory a distinctive account of freedom—republican freedom. On this account, I am not free solely because I can make choices without interference. I am truly free, only if that non-interference does not itself depend on another’s forbearance (what Pettit calls ‘formal’ freedom).
openaire   +2 more sources

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