Results 241 to 250 of about 3,333 (289)
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Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2006
We present a plural logic that is as expressively strong as it can be without sacrificing axiomatisability, axiomatise it, and use it to chart the expressive limits set by axiomatisability. To the standard apparatus of quantification using singular variables our object-language adds plural variables, a predicate expressing inclusion (is/are/is one of ...
Alex Oliver, Timothy Smiley
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We present a plural logic that is as expressively strong as it can be without sacrificing axiomatisability, axiomatise it, and use it to chart the expressive limits set by axiomatisability. To the standard apparatus of quantification using singular variables our object-language adds plural variables, a predicate expressing inclusion (is/are/is one of ...
Alex Oliver, Timothy Smiley
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Beyond Logical Pluralism and Logical Monism
Logica Universalis, 2020The author reviews a number of ``kinds'' of logical pluralism by relying especially on \textit{M. Eklund}'s paper [``Making sense of logical pluralism'', Inquiry 63, No. 3--4, 433--454 (2020; \url{doi:10.1080/0020174X.2017.1321499})]. Towards the end of his article, the author briefly sketches what he calls a new ``view'' of logical pluralism that goes
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Is there a Plural Object? [PDF]
, 2014 A plurality or plural object is a single object that is also many, and pluralitism is the thesis that there is such an object. This paper argues that pluralitism and closely related theses (e.g., the many-one identity thesis and the composition as ...
Byeong-Uk Yi, Yi Byeong-Uk
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The Review of Symbolic Logic, 2009
A number of people have proposed that we should be pluralists about logic, but there are several things this can mean. Are there versions of logical pluralism that are both high on the interest scale and also true? After discussing some forms of pluralism that seem either insufficiently interesting or quite unlikely to be true, the paper suggests a new
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A number of people have proposed that we should be pluralists about logic, but there are several things this can mean. Are there versions of logical pluralism that are both high on the interest scale and also true? After discussing some forms of pluralism that seem either insufficiently interesting or quite unlikely to be true, the paper suggests a new
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Erkenntnis, 2013
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The Logicality of Second-Order Logic
, 2016 This chapter argues against predicative analyses of plurality, which force plurals into the familiar mould of singular logic by turning an apparently plural term standing for several objects into a singular predicate standing for a concept or property ...
Francesca Boccuni
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A note on mathematical pluralism and logical pluralism
Synthese, 2019Mathematical pluralism notes that there are many different kinds of pure mathematical structures—notably those based on different logics—and that, qua pieces of pure mathematics, they are all equally good. Logical pluralism is the view that there are different logics (consequence relations), which are, in an appropriate sense, equally good.
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Synthese, 2019
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Logic and Ontological Pluralism
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2011Ontological pluralism is the doctrine that there are different ways or modes of being. In contemporary guise, it is the doctrine that a logically perspicuous description of reality will use multiple quantifiers which cannot be thought of as ranging over a single domain.
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2005
AbstractThis chapter distinguishes between various senses in which one might be a pluralist about logic. In several of these, pluralism is uncontentiously correct. The difficult issue is whether there are different accounts of validity that are equally correct. It argues for logical monism in this regard.
Beall, JC, Restall, G
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AbstractThis chapter distinguishes between various senses in which one might be a pluralist about logic. In several of these, pluralism is uncontentiously correct. The difficult issue is whether there are different accounts of validity that are equally correct. It argues for logical monism in this regard.
Beall, JC, Restall, G
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