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Practical Reason Standards, Advice, and Practical Reason
2011This chapter considers two sorts of cases in which it might seem as though an adviser is evaluating things from within the advisee's system of standards even though this system conflicts with her own. Based on these cases, the chapter offers a positive argument in favor of the author's contention that there is no mode of sincere advice in which the ...
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PRACTICAL REASONING AND EMOTION
2004AbstractThis article discusses emotion as an element of practical rationality. One approach links emotion to evaluative judgment and applies some variant of the usual standards of rational belief and decision making. An alternative, “paradigm scenarios” approach would appeal to the causal history of an emotion as determining rationality.
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Deliberation and Practical Reason
1998Abstract In Book 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle treats a restricted and technical notion of deliberation, which makes it unnecessary for him to consider anything but technical or so¬ called productive examples of practical reason. It is not surprising in the context of Book 3 that deliberation is never of ends but always of means.
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Reasoning in Practical Situations
2004An automatic reasoning system usually consists of the following major components: (1) a formal language that represents knowledge, (2) a semantics that defines meaning and truth value in the language, (3) a set of inference rules that derives new knowledge from existing knowledge, (4) a memory that stores knowledge, and (5) a control mechanism that ...
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Legal Reasoning as Practical Reason
2011AbstractUnderstanding morality and understanding legal, especially judicial, reasoning each require attention to the distinctions between reason and feelings, and between making and doing. In clarifying these, this chapter considers the denial of objective goods by ‘Critical Legal Studies’; the confusion induced by ‘game’ or ‘decision’ or ‘rational ...
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Philosophy, 1942
“The will is nothing but practical reason.” In other words choice, without being any kind of judgement, resembles inference in being either valid or invalid. Moral lightness is validity of choice.
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“The will is nothing but practical reason.” In other words choice, without being any kind of judgement, resembles inference in being either valid or invalid. Moral lightness is validity of choice.
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2002
Abstract Aristotle took practical reasoning to be reasoning that concludes in an action. But an action—at least a physical one—requires more than reasoning ability; it requires physical ability too. Intending to act is as close to acting as reasoning alone can get us, so we should take practical reasoning to be reasoning that concludes ...
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Abstract Aristotle took practical reasoning to be reasoning that concludes in an action. But an action—at least a physical one—requires more than reasoning ability; it requires physical ability too. Intending to act is as close to acting as reasoning alone can get us, so we should take practical reasoning to be reasoning that concludes ...
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2018
This chapter discusses two contemporary pictures of practical reasoning. According to the Rule-Guidance Conception, roughly, practical reasoning is a rule-guided operation of acquiring (or retaining or giving up) intentions to come to meet synchronic requirements of rationality. According to the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception, practical reasoning is,
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This chapter discusses two contemporary pictures of practical reasoning. According to the Rule-Guidance Conception, roughly, practical reasoning is a rule-guided operation of acquiring (or retaining or giving up) intentions to come to meet synchronic requirements of rationality. According to the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception, practical reasoning is,
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2017
In Ethics 4, Spinoza argues that reason commands us to preserve ourselves, to seek knowledge, and to take particular kinds of action in doing so. This invocation of reason draws upon Ethics 2 and 3 to explain the sense in which human beings will be motivated to act on these prescriptions: knowledge is for Spinoza a kind of activity, and we all possess ...
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In Ethics 4, Spinoza argues that reason commands us to preserve ourselves, to seek knowledge, and to take particular kinds of action in doing so. This invocation of reason draws upon Ethics 2 and 3 to explain the sense in which human beings will be motivated to act on these prescriptions: knowledge is for Spinoza a kind of activity, and we all possess ...
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