Results 271 to 280 of about 100,694 (302)
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Philosophy, 1942
“The will is nothing but practical reason.” In other words choice, without being any kind of judgement, resembles inference in being either valid or invalid. Moral lightness is validity of choice.
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“The will is nothing but practical reason.” In other words choice, without being any kind of judgement, resembles inference in being either valid or invalid. Moral lightness is validity of choice.
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2017
In Ethics 4, Spinoza argues that reason commands us to preserve ourselves, to seek knowledge, and to take particular kinds of action in doing so. This invocation of reason draws upon Ethics 2 and 3 to explain the sense in which human beings will be motivated to act on these prescriptions: knowledge is for Spinoza a kind of activity, and we all possess ...
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In Ethics 4, Spinoza argues that reason commands us to preserve ourselves, to seek knowledge, and to take particular kinds of action in doing so. This invocation of reason draws upon Ethics 2 and 3 to explain the sense in which human beings will be motivated to act on these prescriptions: knowledge is for Spinoza a kind of activity, and we all possess ...
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2008
AbstractThis chapter argues that practical reason is the ability to retain the disembedded, embedded, and embodied dimensions of rationality and to incorporate or distil them into a unified understanding or picture. It is to be able to hold and see the interrelationships between all the dimensions of that with which there is engagement, the ability to ...
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AbstractThis chapter argues that practical reason is the ability to retain the disembedded, embedded, and embodied dimensions of rationality and to incorporate or distil them into a unified understanding or picture. It is to be able to hold and see the interrelationships between all the dimensions of that with which there is engagement, the ability to ...
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2019
This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 33-43 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by presenting Anscombe’s argument that the premises in a practical syllogism, i.e. the considerations from which a person reasons in deciding what she will do, are not supposed to provide a proof of the conclusion that is drawn from them.
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This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 33-43 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by presenting Anscombe’s argument that the premises in a practical syllogism, i.e. the considerations from which a person reasons in deciding what she will do, are not supposed to provide a proof of the conclusion that is drawn from them.
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Practical reasoning as presumptive argumentation using action based alternating transition systems
Artificial Intelligence, 2007Katie Atkinson, Trevor Bench-Capon
exaly
Plans and resource-bounded practical reasoning
Computational Intelligence, 1988Michael E Bratman, Martha E Pollack
exaly