Results 21 to 30 of about 243,902 (282)

Farmers' Preferences for Crop Contracts

open access: yesJournal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 1997
An empirical approach combining elements of principal-agent theory and transaction cost economics is used to determine farmers' preferences for contract terms in crop production. The approach is tested by asking grain farmers to rank contract choices and
Kaouthar Lajili   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Deterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms in Principal–Agent Models [PDF]

open access: yes, 2004
This paper shows that, contrary to what is generally believed, decreasing concavity of the agent’s utility function with respect to the screening variable is not sufficient to ensure that stochastic mechanisms are suboptimal.
Strausz, Roland
core   +1 more source

Decision making in the problems of forest protection from insect pests [PDF]

open access: yesСибирский лесной журнал, 2021
The principles of organization in the forest protection system and the principles of decision-making in the tasks of carrying out protective measures are discussed.
Soldatov V. V., Soukhovolsky V. G.
doaj   +1 more source

Random Horizon Principal-Agent Problems [PDF]

open access: yesSIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 2022
We consider a general formulation of the random horizon Principal-Agent problem with a continuous payment and a lump-sum payment at termination. In the European version of the problem, the random horizon is chosen solely by the principal with no other possible action from the agent than exerting effort on the dynamics of the output process.
Yiqing Lin   +3 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Corrupt procurement: rethinking the roles of principals and agents

open access: yesPolicy Design and Practice, 2022
Public sector procurement is a multi billion dollar activity and requires the highest level of integrity. Even in countries that are relatively free of corruption, there exist many opportunities for corrupt behavior, and there are always individuals who ...
Adam Graycar
doaj   +1 more source

Aversion to the variability of pay and the structure of executive compensation contracts

open access: yesJournal of Business Economics and Management, 2015
This paper presents a new implication of an aversion toward the variance of pay (“risk aversion”) for the structure of managerial incentive schemes. In a principal-agent model in which the effort of a manager with mean-variance preferences affects the ...
Pierre Chaigneau
doaj   +1 more source

A principal-agent model of corruption [PDF]

open access: yes, 1996
One of the new avenues in the study of political corruption is that of neo-institutional economics, of which the principal-agent theory is a part. In this article a principal-agent model of corruption is presented, in which there are two principals (one ...
Groenendijk, Nico
core   +2 more sources

The Principal-Agent Model with an Informative Signal to the Advantage of the Agent [PDF]

open access: yesProblemi Ekonomiki, 2019
This article deals with the problem of negative impact of information asymmetry on the market and methods for mitigating it. This problem is solved by using the methods of the economic theory of contracts.
Nykyforchyn Iryna V.
doaj   +1 more source

Contracting, negotiation, and the policy change: The conflict between Korean farmers and their agricultural coo

open access: yesAgricultural Economics (AGRICECON), 2011
Farmers- owned agricultural cooperatives should have the same interests with their farmer owners. However, the operating team of the cooperatives may have different interests.
H. Holly WANG   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Simulating the Principal-Agent Relationship between Enterprise Owners and Professional Managers Using Evolutionary Game Theory and System Dynamics

open access: yesComplexity, 2021
The separation of ownership and management is a common operation mode in modern enterprises, which establishes the principal-agent relationship between modern enterprise owners and professional managers.
Liang Yuan   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

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