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Random Probing Security with Precomputation [PDF]

open access: yesTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
At Eurocrypt 2014, Duc, Dziembowski and Faust proposed the random probing model to bridge the gap between the probing model proposed at Crypto 2003 and the noisy model proposed at Eurocrypt 2013.
Bohan Wang   +3 more
doaj   +7 more sources

Probing Security through Input-Output Separation and Revisited Quasilinear Masking

open access: yesTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2021
The probing security model is widely used to formally prove the security of masking schemes. Whenever a masked implementation can be proven secure in this model with a reasonable leakage rate, it is also provably secure in a realistic leakage model known
Dahmun Goudarzi   +3 more
doaj   +5 more sources

On the spectral features of robust probing security

open access: yesTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2020
In this work we provide a spectral formalization of non-interference in the presence of glitches. Our goal is to present new theoretical and practical tools to reason about robust-d-probing security.
Maria Chiara Molteni, Vittorio Zaccaria
doaj   +7 more sources

Random Probing Security: Verification, Composition, Expansion and New Constructions [PDF]

open access: yesLecture Notes in Computer Science, 2020
The masking countermeasure is among the most powerful countermeasures to counteract side-channel attacks. Leakage models have been exhibited to theoretically reason on the security of such masked implementations. So far, the most widely used leakage model is the probing model defined by Ishai, Sahai, and Wagner at (CRYPTO 2003).
Emmanuel Prouff   +2 more
exaly   +5 more sources

Testing Security Equivalence in the Random Probing Model

open access: yesTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
The random probing model is a theoretical model that abstracts the physical leakage of an embedded device running a cryptographic scheme with more realistic assumptions compared to the threshold probing model.
Anna Guinet   +5 more
doaj   +5 more sources

An Algebraic Approach for Evaluating Random Probing Security With Application to AES

open access: yesTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
We employ an algebraic approach to estimate the success rate of a sidechannel adversary attacking secrets of a masked circuit within the Random Probing Model (RPM), where intermediate variables of the implementation leak with a probability p. Our method
Vahid Jahandideh   +2 more
doaj   +4 more sources

t-Probing (In-)Security

open access: yesTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
The ongoing transition to post-quantum cryptography has led to a surge of research in side-channel countermeasures tailored to these schemes. A prominent method to prove security in the context of side-channel analysis is the utilization of the well ...
Dina Hesse   +6 more
doaj   +3 more sources

PROLEAD

open access: yesTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2022
Even today, Side-Channel Analysis attacks pose a serious threat to the security of cryptographic implementations fabricated with low-power and nanoscale feature technologies.
Nicolai Müller, Amir Moradi
doaj   +3 more sources

Quantile: Quantifying Information Leakage

open access: yesTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2023
The masking countermeasure is very effective against side-channel attacks such as differential power analysis. However, the design of masked circuits is a challenging problem since one has to ensure security while minimizing performance overheads.
Vedad Hadžic   +4 more
doaj   +1 more source

Secure Wire Shuffling in the Probing Model [PDF]

open access: yes, 2021
In this paper we describe the first improvement of the wire shuffling countermeasure against side-channel attacks described by Ishai, Sahai and Wagner at Crypto 2003. More precisely, we show how to get worst case statistical security against t probes with running time \({\mathcal O}(t)\) instead of \({\mathcal O}(t \log t)\); our construction is also ...
Jean-Sébastien Coron, Lorenzo Spignoli
openaire   +1 more source

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