Results 11 to 20 of about 10,096 (237)

Testing Security Equivalence in the Random Probing Model [PDF]

open access: yesIACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
The random probing model is a theoretical model that abstracts the physical leakage of an embedded device running a cryptographic scheme with more realistic assumptions compared to the threshold probing model. It assumes that the wires of the target device leak their assigned values with probability p, and the said values may reveal information about ...
Anna Guinet   +5 more
core   +4 more sources

Tornado: Automatic Generation of Probing-Secure Masked Bitsliced Implementations [PDF]

open access: yes, 2020
Cryptographic implementations deployed in real world devices often aim at (provable) security against the powerful class of side-channel attacks while keeping reasonable performances. Last year at Asiacrypt, a new formal verification tool named tightPROVE was put forward to exactly determine whether a masked implementation is secure in the well ...
Belaïd, Sonia   +4 more
openaire   +4 more sources

A Low Area Probing Detector for Security ICs

open access: yes, 2014
In this paper, a low cost, Low Area Probing Detector (LAPD) is presented. Probing or microprobing is an attack technique against integrated circuits implementing security functions, such as OTP tokens or smartcards. It allows intercepting secrets from on-chip wires as well as injecting faults for other attacks.
Weiner, Michael   +2 more
core   +4 more sources

Analysis and Probing of Parallel Channels in the Lightning Network [PDF]

open access: yes, 2022
peer reviewedBitcoin can process only a few transactions per second, which is insufficient for a global payment network. The Lightning Network (LN) aims to address this challenge.
TIKHOMIROV, Sergei   +5 more
core   +1 more source

An Algebraic Approach for Evaluating Random Probing Security With Application to AES

open access: yesIACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
We employ an algebraic approach to estimate the success rate of a sidechannel adversary attacking secrets of a masked circuit within the Random Probing Model (RPM), where intermediate variables of the implementation leak with a probability p. Our method efficiently handles masked linear circuits, enabling security bound estimation for practically large
Jahandideh Khajeh, V.   +2 more
openaire   +4 more sources

An analysis of random probing security properties in masked cryptographic circuits [PDF]

open access: yes, 2022
LAUREA MAGISTRALEIn questa tesi esploriamo le proprietà di sicurezza contro sonde probabilistiche su un circuito, ovvero come la sua sicurezza resiste un avversario in grado di vedere il valore di ogni filo con una certa probabilità. In particolare, ci
MANZONI, GIUSEPPE
core  

Towards Tight Random Probing Security - extended version

open access: yes, 2021
Proving the security of masked implementations in theoretical models that are relevant to practice and match the best known attacks of the side-channel literature is a notoriously hard problem.
Faust, Sebastian   +4 more
core   +1 more source

ProbeGuard: Mitigating Probing Attacks Through Reactive Program Transformations [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
Many modern defenses against code reuse rely on hiding sensitive data such as shadow stacks in a huge memory address space. While much more efficient than traditional integritybased defenses, these solutions are vulnerable to probing attacks which ...
Bhat, Koustubha   +10 more
core   +1 more source

Probing Security through Input-Output Separation and Revisited Quasilinear Masking

open access: yes, 2021
The probing security model is widely used to formally prove the security of masking schemes. Whenever a masked implementation can be proven secure in this model with a reasonable leakage rate, it is also provably secure in a realistic leakage model known
Dahmun Goudarzi   +7 more
core   +1 more source

Real-World Snapshots vs. Theory: Questioning the t-Probing Security Model

open access: yes, 2021
S.1955-1971Due to its sound theoretical basis and practical efficiency, masking has become the most prominent countermeasure to protect cryptographic implementations against physical side-channel attacks (SCAs).
Shahin Tajik   +9 more
core   +1 more source

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