Results 11 to 20 of about 110 (106)
Ratio, Volume 39, Issue 1, Page 10-16, March 2026.ABSTRACT Preservationism in the philosophy of memory is dead, according to many. This opinion is not ill‐founded. It appears to be justified both by common sense and by empirical psychology. But in what follows we explain how and why an independently motivated form of preservationism, modal preservationism, survives.
Sven Bernecker, Paul Silva Jr
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Journal of Applied Philosophy, Volume 43, Issue 1, Page 178-198, February 2026.ABSTRACT Psychedelics offer an intriguing novel method for changing minds, supposedly by destabilizing the neurobiology of the belief system. The resulting power to change minds raises ethical and epistemic concerns. This article examines the epistemic status of psychedelic experiences and suggests a skeptical attitude towards beliefs formed under ...
Jan Christoph Bublitz
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Future in Educational Research, Volume 3, Issue 4, Page 569-579, December 2025.ABSTRACT This conceptual essay, grounded in a close reading of Plato's Theaetetus, argues that before educators can effectively operationalise critical thinking as the rigorous evaluation ('stress‐testing') of competing knowledge claims, university students must first understand foundational epistemological principles rooted in Plato's tripartite ...
Gerry Dunne
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Categorial versus naturalized epistemology
Analytic Philosophy, Volume 66, Issue 4, Page 658-673, December 2025.Abstract How do we know what kinds of things constitute knowledge or justified belief? Naturalized epistemology is committed to denying a priori insight into the kinds of kinds that are and are not knowledge or justification makers. By contrast, it is argued here that knowledge of these matters is a priori knowledge of a special kind.
Nick Zangwill
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Perfect‐Recall and Bootstrapping Reasoning
Theoria, Volume 91, Issue 6, December 2025.ABSTRACT Bootstrapping is a suspicious form of reasoning that seems to allow agents to gain knowledge about the reliability of their sources of information ‘from thin air’, without gathering independent evidence about those sources. The bootstrapping problem is the problem of explaining what is wrong with bootstrapping reasoning.
Michael Cohen
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Philosophical Issues, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 115-125, October 2025.ABSTRACT Having evidence does not in itself make a doxastic attitude justified even if the evidence supports the attitude in question. Plausibly, one must also appreciate the support one's evidence provides for the doxastic attitude. Although such appreciation seems central to the picture of justification offered by Evidentialism, its nature has been ...
Kevin McCain
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Mind &Language, Volume 40, Issue 4, Page 402-417, September 2025.P. F. Strawson famously distinguishes what a speaker presupposes from what she asserts in uttering a sentence like “The present King of France is bald”. This paper defends a claim about presupposition's epistemic significance, namely that presupposition can provide a distinctive testimony‐based way for an audience to learn about the world.
Dominic Alford‐Duguid
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 111, Issue 1, Page 343-365, July 2025.Abstract I argue for a pluralist theory of moral standing, on which both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral status. I argue that autonomy does not entail welfare subjectivity, but can ground moral standing in its absence. Although I highlight the existence of plausible views on which autonomy entails phenomenal consciousness, I ...
Andreas L. Mogensen
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Non‐ideal epistemic rationality
Philosophical Issues, Volume 34, Issue 1, Page 72-95, October 2024.Abstract I develop a broadly reliabilist theory of non‐ideal epistemic rationality and argue that if it is correct we should reject the recently popular idea that the standards of non‐ideal epistemic rationality are mere social conventions.
Nick Hughes
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Belief-Independent Processes and the Generality Problem for Reliabilism
Dialectica, 2005 The Generality Problem for process reliabilism is to outline a procedure for determining when two beliefs are produced by the same process, in such a way as to avoid, on the one hand, individuating process types so narrowly that each type is instantiated only once, or, on the other hand, individuating them so broadly that beliefs that have different ...
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