Results 21 to 30 of about 110 (106)

Representation in action

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, Volume 32, Issue 3, Page 690-707, September 2024.
Abstract When one is intentionally doing something, one represents that thing as a goal to be accomplished. One represents it practically. How should we characterize this practical representation further? In this paper, I argue that when one is intentionally doing something, one's representation of it as a goal to be accomplished must also be knowledge
Alec Hinshelwood
wiley   +1 more source

Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism

open access: yes, 2008
A central issue in contemporary epistemology is whether there is a species of (prima facie) justification that is immediate, direct, basic, or foundational. It is puzzling whether and how immediate justification could arise. This is perhaps the core issue that divides foundationalists from coherentists. An older conception of immediate justification is
openaire   +1 more source

The factivity of practical knowledge

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, Volume 32, Issue 3, Page 728-742, September 2024.
Abstract Anscombean accounts claim that intentional action is essentially characterized by an agent's practical knowledge of what she is doing. Such accounts are threatened by cases in which an agent seemingly fails to know what she is doing because of a mistake in the performance. It thus seems that such accounts are incompatible with the factivity of
Dawa Ometto, Niels van Miltenburg
wiley   +1 more source

Is evidence‐based practice justified?—A philosophical critique

open access: yesJournal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, Volume 30, Issue 5, Page 855-859, August 2024.
Abstract Background Evidence‐based practice is the principle governing a range of healthcare practices and beyond. However, it has suffered from a lack of philosophical rigour. This paper sets out to analyse the epistemological basis of evidence‐based practice. Method The paper uses a conceptual analysis.
Henrik Berg
wiley   +1 more source

Naturalizing skepticism

open access: yesMetaphilosophy, Volume 55, Issue 3, Page 301-315, July 2024.
Abstract Naturalism, construed as the idea that philosophy should be continuous with science, is a highly influential view. Its consequences for epistemology, however, are rather odd. Many believe that naturalized epistemology allows eschewing traditional skeptical challenges.
Marc Jiménez‐Rolland
wiley   +1 more source

Imagination as a generative source of justification

open access: yesNoûs, Volume 58, Issue 2, Page 386-408, June 2024.
Abstract One of the most exciting debates in philosophy of imagination in recent years has been over the epistemic use of imagination where imagination epistemically contributes to justifying beliefs and acquiring knowledge. This paper defends “generationism about imagination” according to which imagination is a generative source, rather than a ...
Kengo Miyazono, Uku Tooming
wiley   +1 more source

Gettier and the a priori

open access: yesRatio, Volume 37, Issue 2-3, Page 93-101, June-September 2024.
Abstract In 1967, Alvin Goldman prominently claimed that the traditional JTB analysis is adequate for non‐empirical knowledge. Since then, this claim has remained widely unchallenged. In this paper, I show that this claim is false. I provide two examples in which a true belief is a priori justified but epistemically defective such that it does not ...
Philipp Berghofer
wiley   +1 more source

Reliability in Machine Learning

open access: yesPhilosophy Compass, Volume 19, Issue 5, May 2024.
Abstract Issues of reliability are claiming center‐stage in the epistemology of machine learning. This paper unifies different branches in the literature and points to promising research directions, whilst also providing an accessible introduction to key concepts in statistics and machine learning – as far as they are concerned with reliability.
Thomas Grote   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

The consequences of seeing imagination as a dual‐process virtue

open access: yesMetaphilosophy, Volume 55, Issue 2, Page 162-174, April 2024.
Abstract Michael T. Stuart (2021 and 2022) has proposed imagination as an intellectual dual‐process virtue, consisting of imagination1 (underwritten by cognitive Type 1 processing) and imagination2 (supported by Type 2 processing). This paper investigates the consequences of taking such an account seriously.
Ingrid Malm Lindberg
wiley   +1 more source

The new evil demon problem at 40

open access: yes
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 109, Issue 2, Page 478-504, September 2024.
Peter J. Graham
wiley   +1 more source

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