A social system to disperse the irrigation start date based on the spatial public goods game. [PDF]
Nakagawa Y, Yokozawa M.
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Higher-order interactions and zero-determinant strategies in the public goods game
Since the ingenious discovery of zero-determinant (ZD) strategies by Press and Dyson, many efforts have been devoted to the evolutionary performance of ZD strategies. Recently, the effects of higher-order interactions on evolutionary games have attracted
Junchi Li
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Human cooperation in changing groups in a large-scale public goods game. [PDF]
Otten K +4 more
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Emotion helps people hide from traitors and follow partners. It greatly affects the actual migration in a public goods game (PGG). How this factor affect the migration and the corresponding cooperation level has still not been investigated yet.
Youxing Ji, Min Tan, Hui Long
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Financial Control of a Competitive Economy without Randomness [PDF]
The monetary and fiscal control of a simple economy without outside randomness is studied here from the micro-economic basis of a strategic market game. The government's bureaucracy is treated as a public good that provides services at a cost.
Ioannis Karatzas +2 more
core
Willingness intensity and co-evolution of decision rationality depending on aspiration enhance cooperation in the spatial public goods game. [PDF]
Lu S, Zhu G, Dai J.
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‘Pocket and Pot’: Hypothetical Bias in a No-Free-Riding Public Contribution Game [PDF]
Hypothetical bias arises when values which people say they place on a good or service differ systematically from the values people reveal for the same good or service through actual, binding economic transactions.
Adamowicz, Wiktor L. +2 more
core +1 more source
The study on the role of dedicators on promoting cooperation in public goods game. [PDF]
Wu Z, Huang H, Liao Q.
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Axiomatization of Ratio Equilibria in Public Good Economies. [PDF]
Using consistency properties, we characterize the cost-sharing scheme arising from the ratio equilibrium concept for economies with public goods. The characterization turns out to be surprisingly simple and direct.
van den Nouweland, A., Wooders, M.H.
core
Selfish risk-seeking can provide an evolutionary advantage in a conditional public goods game. [PDF]
Testori M, Eisenbarth H, Hoyle RB.
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