Results 31 to 40 of about 563,294 (216)
How Do Public Goods Providers Play Public Goods Games? [PDF]
We study how policymakers play public goods games, and how their behavior compares to the typical subjects we study, by conducting parallel experiments on college undergraduates and American state legislators. We find that the legislators play public goods games more cooperatively and more consistently than the undergraduates. Legislators are also less
Butler, Daniel M, Kousser, Thad
openaire +3 more sources
Analyzing reciprocity dynamics in supply chains of public goods: a stochastic evolutionary game approach [PDF]
To start with an infinitely repeated game of supply chains of public goods, a stout reciprocity mechanism is introduced into income games to build a matric dynamic equation.
Simo Sun, Man Wang, Yi Lei
doaj +2 more sources
Extinction rates in tumour public goods games [PDF]
Cancer evolution and progression are shaped by cellular interactions and Darwinian selection. Evolutionary game theory incorporates both of these principles, and has been proposed as a framework to understand tumour cell population dynamics. A cornerstone of evolutionary dynamics is the replicator equation, which describes changes in the relative ...
Gerlee, Philip, Altrock, Philipp M.
openaire +2 more sources
Replicator Dynamics for Optional Public Good Games [PDF]
The public goods game represents a straightforward generalization of the prisoner's dilemma to an arbitrary number of players. Since the dominant strategy is to defect, both classical and evolutionary game theory predict the asocial outcome that no player contributes to the public goods.
Hauert, Christoph +3 more
openaire +3 more sources
Ecological public goods games: Cooperation and bifurcation [PDF]
The Public Goods Game is one of the most popular models for studying the origin and maintenance of cooperation. In its simplest form, this evolutionary game has two regimes: defection goes to fixation if the multiplication factor r is smaller than the interaction group size N, whereas cooperation goes to fixation if the multiplication factor r is ...
Hauert, Christoph +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
Cooperation evolution of dynamic interaction based on threshold in public goods game [PDF]
To analyze the impact of interaction size on cooperation level and population average payoff in the public goods game with punishment, by combining Monte Carlo simulation with the characteristics of real complex interaction environments, a dynamic ...
Xiangyang XU, Yajie LIU, Jinlong MA
doaj +1 more source
Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as ...
Jose C. Yong, Bryan K. C. Choy
doaj +1 more source
Sociological Analysis of Social Interactions from the perspective of Game Theory [PDF]
Understanding the social interactions between individuals and social groups whose decisions and the way they achieve their goals are interdependent, has been the basis for the formation of game theory. By expanding its scope of application from economics
سید مهدی کاظمی تربقان +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Public goods games on adaptive coevolutionary networks [PDF]
Productive societies feature high levels of cooperation and strong connections between individuals. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are frequently used to study the development of social connections and cooperative behavior in model societies. In such games, contributions to the public good are made only by cooperators, while all players, including defectors,
Shapiro, Avi M., Pichler, Elgar
openaire +3 more sources
Explaining Public Goods Game Contributions with Rational Ability
As the link between psychology and economics has grown, so too has research on the link between personality traits and economic behavior. We build on this previous work, bringing to light the relationship between personality traits and contributions in a
Hannes Lang +2 more
doaj +1 more source

