Results 141 to 150 of about 6,624 (185)

Experimental Hardware for Coating PUFs and Optical PUFs

2007
In this chapter we discuss the hardware that was used to perform experiments on physical unclonable functions (PUFs).We describe the measurement setups and experimental samples in the case of coating PUFs and optical PUFs. These are two vastly different systems-the former based on integrated circuit (IC) technology and the latter on laser optics.
Skoric, Boris, Schrijen, Geert Jan, Ophey, Wil, Wolters, Rob, Verhaegh, Nynke, van Geloven, Jan   +5 more
openaire   +1 more source

A microcontroller SRAM-PUF

2011 5th International Conference on Network and System Security, 2011
Key storage is a well-known security issue. Usually, keys are generated and then stored in an non-volatile memory (NVM). A promising alternative are the so-called physical unclonable functions (PUFs). These functions extract key material directly from manufacturing variabilities of a device. One example of such a PUF is the SRAM-PUF.
Christoph Böhm 0003, Maximilian Hofer, Wolfgang Pribyl   +2 more
openaire   +1 more source

G-PUF: An Intrinsic PUF Based on GPU Error Signatures

2020 IEEE European Test Symposium (ETS), 2020
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are security primitives that provide trustworthy hardware for key-generation and device authentication. Among them, in contrast to dedicated PUFs, intrinsic PUFs are created from existing hardware components that exploit their variability through software.
Bruno Endres Forlin, Ronaldo Husemann, Luigi Carro, Cezar Reinbrecht, Said Hamdioui, Mottaqiallah Taouil   +5 more
openaire   +1 more source

Invasive PUF Analysis

2013 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography, 2013
In this work we consider the suitability of Phyiscaly Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for high-security applications. For PUFs to be considered secure in such scenarios they must be resilient to both semi-invasive and fully-invasive attacks. We introduce a new failure analysis technique for semi-invasive, single-trace, backside readout of logic states.
Dmitry Nedospasov, Jean-Pierre Seifert, Clemens Helfmeier, Christian Boit   +3 more
openaire   +1 more source

PUF Interfaces and their Security

2014 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, 2014
In practice, any integrated physical unclonable function (PUF) must be accessed through a logical interface. The interface may add additional functionalities such as access control, implement a (measurement) noise reduction layer, etc. In many PUF applications, the interface in fact hides the PUF itself: users only interact with the PUF's interface ...
Marten van Dijk, Uli Rührmair
openaire   +1 more source

Strong PUFs and their (physical) unpredictability

Proceedings of the Workshop on Embedded Systems Security, 2013
Physically Unclonable Functions are more and more important in the design of secure hardware, as they can ensure properties that conventional cryptography can not. In this paper we clarify the relations between strong PUFs and their unpredictability. For this purpose we first introduce an alternative definition for physical unpredictability, where the ...
ParusinskiM., Shariati S., Kamel D., Standaert F.-X.   +3 more
openaire   +1 more source

DA PUF

Proceedings of the 59th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference, 2022
Jiliang Zhang 0002, Lin Ding, Zhuojun Chen, Wenshang Li, Gang Qu 0001   +4 more
openaire   +1 more source

PI PUF: A Processor-Intrinsic PUF for IoT

Computers and Electrical Engineering, 2023
Li Ni, Pengjun Wang, Yuejun Zhang, Gang Li 0038, Lin Ding, Jiliang Zhang 0002   +5 more
openaire   +1 more source

On the Amount of Entropy in PUFs

2007
The aim of this chapter is to provide an information-theoretic framework for the analysis of physical unclonable function (PUF) security. We set up this framework and then apply it to optical PUFs and coating PUFs. From the description of PUFs in Chapter 1 some obvious questions arise in the context of the security primitives discussed in Part I.
Tuyls, Pim, Skoric, Boris
openaire   +2 more sources

Buskeeper PUFs, a promising alternative to D Flip-Flop PUFs

2012 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2012
Cloning, theft of service and tampering have become serious threats on the revenue and reputation of hardware vendors. To protect their products against these attacks hardware security, based on cryptographic primitives using keys, can be used. These keys are usually stored somewhere in the hardware, so the strength of the security depends on the ...
Peter Simons, Erik van der Sluis, Vincent van der Leest   +2 more
openaire   +1 more source