Results 161 to 170 of about 2,111 (192)

On the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium

Economics Letters, 2007
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Pure Nash Equilibrium and Strong Nash Equilibrium Computation in Additive Aggregate Games

International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Aggregate games, first conceptualized by Nobel laureate Reinhard Selten in 1970, model the decision-making of interdependent agents where each agent's utility depends on their own action and the aggregation of everyone's actions. We consider computational questions on pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) and pure strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) for aggregate ...
Jared Soundy, Mohammad T. Irfan, Hau Chan   +2 more
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Approximating pure nash equilibrium in cut, party affiliation, and satisfiability games

Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2010
Cut games and party affiliation games are well-known classes of potential games. Schaffer and Yannakakis showed that computing pure Nash equilibrium in these games is PLS-complete. In general potential games, even the problem of computing any finite approximation to a pure equilibrium is also PLS-complete.
Anand Bhalgat, Tanmoy Chakraborty 0001, Sanjeev Khanna   +2 more
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Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities

Games and Economic Behavior, 1997
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Konishi, Hideo, Le Breton, Michel, Weber, Shlomo   +2 more
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Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the spatial model with valence: existence and characterization

Public Choice, 2021
Pure-strategy Nash equilibria almost never exist in spatial majority voting games when the number of positional dimensions is at least two, as the majority core is typically empty when more than one positional dimension is modeled. In the general setting of proper spatial voting games, we study the existence of equilibrium when one candidate has a ...
Martin, Mathieu, Nganmeni, Zéphirin, Piggins, Ashley, Tchouante, Élise   +3 more
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Existence of Risk Strategy Equilibrium in Games Having No Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium

2009
Two key properties defining an intelligent agent are reactive and pro-active. Before designing an intelligent agent for any multi-agent system, we need to first understand how agents should behave and interact in that particular application, which can be done by modelling the application as a game . To analyze these games and to understand how decision-
Ka-man Lam, Ho-fung Leung
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The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma

Games and Economic Behavior
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Vasily V. Gusev, Alexander Nesterov, Mikhail Reshetov, Alex Suzdaltsev   +3 more
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The pure Nash equilibrium property and the quasi-acyclic condition [PDF]

Economics Bulletin, 2002
This paper presents a sufficient condition for the quasi-acyclic condition. A game is quasi-acyclic if from any strategy profile, there exists a finite sequence of strict best replies that ends in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The best-reply dynamics must converge to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in any quasi-acyclic game.
Tetsuo Yamamori, Satoru Takahashi
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On the existence of almost-pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in n-person finite games

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2006
This paper gives wide characterization of n-person non-coalitional games with finite players’ strategy spaces and payoff functions having some concavity or convexity properties. The characterization is done in terms of the existence of two-point-strategy Nash equilibria, that is equilibria consisting only of mixed strategies with supports being one or ...
Wojciech Polowczuk, Piotr Wiecek, Tadeusz Radzik   +2 more
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Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium Points in Non-Anonymous Games

1997
We present an example of a nonaiomic game without pure Nash equilibria. In the example, the set of players is modelled on the Lebesgue unit interval with an equicontinuous family of payoff functions, and an identical action set given by [–1,1]. This example is sharper than that recently presented by Rath-Sun-Yamashige in that the relationship between ...
M. Ali Khan, Kali P. Rath, Yeneng Sun
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