Results 211 to 220 of about 2,154,790 (237)

The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma

Games and Economic Behavior
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Vasily V. Gusev, Alexander Nesterov, Mikhail Reshetov, Alex Suzdaltsev   +3 more
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Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the spatial model with valence: existence and characterization

Public Choice, 2021
Pure-strategy Nash equilibria almost never exist in spatial majority voting games when the number of positional dimensions is at least two, as the majority core is typically empty when more than one positional dimension is modeled. In the general setting of proper spatial voting games, we study the existence of equilibrium when one candidate has a ...
Martin, Mathieu, Nganmeni, Zéphirin, Piggins, Ashley, Tchouante, Élise   +3 more
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The pure Nash equilibrium property and the quasi-acyclic condition [PDF]

Economics Bulletin, 2002
This paper presents a sufficient condition for the quasi-acyclic condition. A game is quasi-acyclic if from any strategy profile, there exists a finite sequence of strict best replies that ends in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The best-reply dynamics must converge to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in any quasi-acyclic game.
Tetsuo Yamamori, Satoru Takahashi
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On the existence of almost-pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in n-person finite games

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2006
This paper gives wide characterization of n-person non-coalitional games with finite players’ strategy spaces and payoff functions having some concavity or convexity properties. The characterization is done in terms of the existence of two-point-strategy Nash equilibria, that is equilibria consisting only of mixed strategies with supports being one or ...
Wojciech Polowczuk, Piotr Wiecek, Tadeusz Radzik   +2 more
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Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium Points in Non-Anonymous Games

1997
We present an example of a nonaiomic game without pure Nash equilibria. In the example, the set of players is modelled on the Lebesgue unit interval with an equicontinuous family of payoff functions, and an identical action set given by [–1,1]. This example is sharper than that recently presented by Rath-Sun-Yamashige in that the relationship between ...
M. Ali Khan, Kali P. Rath, Yeneng Sun
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-Hardness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Scheduling and Connection Games.

2009
We prove $\mathcal{NP}$-hardness of pure Nash equilibrium for some problems of scheduling games and connection games. The technique is standard: first, we construct a gadget without the desired property and then embed it to a larger game which encodes a $\mathcal{NP}$-hard problem in order to prove the complexity of the desired property in a game. This
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Pure Nash equilibriums and independent dominating sets in evolutionary games on networks

Journal of Dynamics and Games
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Mocenni, Chiara, Moraes, Jean Carlo
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Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium and Simultaneous-Move Games with Complete Information

2016
This chapter analyzes behavior in relatively simple strategic settings: simultaneous-move games of complete information. Let us define the two building blocks of this chapter: best responses and Nash equilibrium.
Felix Munoz-Garcia, Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
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Finding Pure Nash Equilibrium of Graphical Game Via Constraints Satisfaction Approach

2007
Considerable progress has been made in recent years in complexity analysis of Nash equilibrium, so we restrict our attention to seek it from the empirical perspective in this paper. Based on a new description format of game - stimulate - response pair proposed in the paper, we put forward a constraints satisfaction-based algorithm on this data ...
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Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Contests with Endogenous Prizes [PDF]

Economics Bulletin, 2012
This paper considers a contest with an endogenous prize, which is increasing in aggregate efforts of the players. Each player may have a different valuation of the prize and a different ability to convert expenditures to productive efforts. Under standard assumptions in the literature, we prove that there exists a unique pure Nash equilibrium in ...
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