Results 41 to 50 of about 2,265 (182)

Virtue Perspectivism, Normativity, and the Unity of Knowledge

open access: yesDaimon, 2018
It will be argued that personal agency, far from lacking epistemic value, contributes to knowledge in a substantial way. To this end, it will be claimed that what Sosa calls an epistemic perspective is necessary to solve the binding problem in ...
Modesto Gómez Alonso
doaj   +1 more source

Cartesian Humility and Pyrrhonian Passivity: The Ethical Significance of Epistemic Agency [PDF]

open access: yes, 2016
While the Academic sceptics followed the plausible as a criterion of truth and guided their practice by a doxastic norm, so thinking that agential performances are actions for which the agent assumes responsibility, the Pyrrhonists did not accept ...
Gómez-Alonso, Modesto
core  

Nietzsche's Conception of Skepticism as Intellectual Virtue and Vice

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, Volume 33, Issue 4, Page 1466-1485, December 2025.
Abstract Recent approaches are unable to make full sense of Nietzsche's distinction between weak and strong skepticism (BGE 208–209; A54). In this paper, I propose an alternative interpretation. My suggestion is that this distinction is best understood in the context of his virtue epistemology.
Lorenzo Serini
wiley   +1 more source

Descartes and Skepticism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
In this paper, I present an interpretation of Descartes that deemphasizes his skepticism. I analyze a selection of remarks from Descartes’ correspondence in which he makes judgments about the skeptics.
Sachdev, Raman
core   +1 more source

Quietist Elements in Adorno

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 700-720, June 2025.
Abstract In this article I take a closer look at Adorno's methodology, and specifically the question of how – in Adorno's view – philosophy ought to be done. In this, my aim is to see whether there might be ‘quietist’ elements in his methodological account, i.e. the meta‐philosophical position of quietism as it stands against (scientific) naturalism in
Christian Lamp
wiley   +1 more source

THE SYSTEMATIC USE OF THE FIVE MODES FOR THE SUSPENSION OF JUDGEMENT

open access: yesManuscrito, 2019
The five modes are a list of tools used by ancient sceptics to guide dogmatic people towards suspending their judgement. Attributed to Agrippa (of uncertain date) and used extensively by Sextus Empiricus (2nd or 3rd century CE), these modes are still ...
DANIEL VÁZQUEZ
doaj   +1 more source

Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Internalist Challenge [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
The paper highlights how a popular version of epistemological disjunctivism labors under a kind of 'internalist challenge'—a challenge that seems to have gone largely unacknowledged by disjunctivists.
Shaw, Kegan
core  

Daring to doubt! Shaftesbury, doubt, and polite conversation

open access: yesThe Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 63, Issue 2, Page 192-210, June 2025.
Abstract Shaftesbury thought that dogmatism was an epistemic vice that violated the norms of good inquiry by inhibiting the proper exercise of reason. One way that Shaftesbury attempted to defend against dogmatic thought and culture was to recommend that society followed the norms of what he called “polite conversation.” This notion has received a fair
Sean Maroney
wiley   +1 more source

From Pyrrho to Sextus Empiricus: The Philosophical Roots of Postmodern Political Theory in Ancient Greek Skepticism

open access: yesPhilosophies
In this article, the philosophical (critical) continuity between ancient Greek skepticism (Pyrrhonism) and postmodern political theory is pointed out.
Ziya Kıvanç Kıraç   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

El escepticismo en el pensamiento político e histórico de David Hume [PDF]

open access: yes, 2018
This essay argues that Hume’s political and historical thought is well read as skeptical and skeptical in a way that roots it deeply in the Hellenistic traditions of both Pyrrhonian and Academical thought. It deploys skeptical instruments to undermine
Fosl, Peter S.
core  

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