Results 51 to 60 of about 2,265 (182)

What do we do when we suspend judgement?

open access: yesPhilosophical Issues, Volume 34, Issue 1, Page 253-270, October 2024.
Abstract According to a classical view, suspension of judgement is, like belief and disbelief, a cognitive state. However, as some authors (Crawford 2022; Lord 2020; McGrath 2021a, 2021b; Sosa 2019, 2021) have pointed out, to suspend judgement is also to perform a certain mental action.
Anne Meylan
wiley   +1 more source

Doubt Undogmatized

open access: yesPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2000
It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart.
Duncan Pritchard
doaj  

The effort to be neutral

open access: yesThe Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 3, Page 348-357, September 2024.
Abstract My aim in this article is to elucidate the nature of a form of intellectual and practical neutrality that is not covered by existing accounts of suspension of judgment. After rejecting some inadequate characterizations of this attitude of neutrality, I provide a positive characterization of it: it is a successful effort to resist certain ...
Benoit Gaultier
wiley   +1 more source

Nietzsche: Metaphysician [PDF]

open access: yes, 2021
Perhaps the most fundamental disagreement concerning Nietzsche's view of metaphysics is that some commentators believe Nietzsche has a positive, systematic metaphysical project, and others deny this.
Remhof, Justin
core   +2 more sources

Philosophy and biography

open access: yesMetaphilosophy, Volume 55, Issue 3, Page 328-337, July 2024.
Abstract Does the biography of a philosopher have any relevance to assessing their philosophy? After considering and rejecting three distinct treatments of this question, a different answer is articulated here. Distinguishing between the content and approach of a philosophical text, this article argues that biography is relevant to assessing the ...
Paul O'Grady
wiley   +1 more source

Pyrrhonian Relativism

open access: yesElenchos, 2015
Abstract This paper argues that Sextus Empiricus’s Pyrrhonism is a form of relativism markedly different from the positions typically referred to by this term. The scholars who have explored the relativistic elements found in Sextus’s texts have claimed that his outlook is not actually a form of relativism, or that those elements are ...
openaire   +2 more sources

Scepticism about Scepticism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2015
Skeptical arguments are intuitively gripping. Or at least they seem to be. They readily capture the imagination and curiosity of beginners in philosophy. The arguments are easy to state but seemingly impossible to answer.
Zangwill, Nick
core   +2 more sources

Naturalizing skepticism

open access: yesMetaphilosophy, Volume 55, Issue 3, Page 301-315, July 2024.
Abstract Naturalism, construed as the idea that philosophy should be continuous with science, is a highly influential view. Its consequences for epistemology, however, are rather odd. Many believe that naturalized epistemology allows eschewing traditional skeptical challenges.
Marc Jiménez‐Rolland
wiley   +1 more source

Pyrrhonian language

open access: yesRónai – Revista de Estudos Clássicos e Tradutórios, 2020
This article characterises how the Pyrrhonian Sceptic uses language to test if such use is susceptible to Dogmatic criticisms, especially from a Stoic perspective. It will examine two characterisations of that use. The first one, reported by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of Eminent Philosophers 9.71-78, will be discussed as a logical use of human ...
openaire   +2 more sources

O ceticismo pirrônico no discurso de John Dewey

open access: yesRevista Educação e Cultura Contemporânea, 2018
Este artigo é motivado pela necessidade de elucidar rigorosamente o significado do termo ceticismo, usualmente identificado com a simples negação de qualquer crença, conhecimento ou certeza.
Marcus Vinicius da Cunha   +1 more
doaj   +1 more source

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