Results 61 to 70 of about 1,571 (143)

Sobre Contra os Gramáticos, de Sexto Empírico

open access: yesDoisPontos, 2007
This paper wants to show some points on Sextus Empiricus’ Against the Grammarians. This research has been made with some questions in the horizon – frighten ones.
Ana Paula El-Jaick
doaj  

Authority without privilege: How to be a Dretskean conciliatory skeptic on self-knowledge [PDF]

open access: yes, 2021
Dretske is a “conciliatory skeptic” on self-knowledge. Take some subject S such that S thinks that P and S knows that she has thoughts. Dretske’s theory can be put as follows: S has a privileged way of knowing what she thinks, but she has no privileged ...
Roche, Michael, Roche, William
core  

Pierre Bayle: el pirronismo contra la razón en el commentaire philosophique

open access: yesRevista Latinoamericana de Filosofía, 2010
Últimamente Pierre Bayle ha sido interpretado como un racionalista, pero este artículo arguye lo contrario, que igualmente se puede interpretarle como un escéptico pirrónico.
John Christian Laursen
doaj  

Skeptical Fideism in Cicero’s De Natura Deorum [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
The work of Richard H. Popkin both introduced the concept of skeptical fideism and served to impressively document its importance in the philosophies of a diverse range of thinkers, including Montaigne, Pascal, Huet, and Bayle.
Ribeiro, Brian
core  

The hardness of the iconic must: Can Peirce’s existential graphs assist modal epistemology? [PDF]

open access: yes, 2011
Charles Peirce’s diagrammatic logic - the Existential Graphs - is presented as a tool for illuminating how we know necessity, in answer to Benacerraf’s famous challenge that most “semantics for mathematics” do not “fit an acceptable epistemology”.
Legg, Catherine
core   +3 more sources

Jak správně filosofovat: k pojetí pravé filosofie u Davida Huma

open access: yesFilosofický časopis
A unique feature of Hume’s epistemology is his concern for the philosopher’s state of mind in the process of doing philosophy. Philosophizing should bring agreeable feelings and avoid such contemplations that lead to distress.
Parusniková, Zuzana
doaj   +1 more source

Epistemic Contrastivism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2017
Contrastivism about knowledge is the view that one does not just know some proposition. It is more adequate to say that one knows something rather than something else: I know that I am looking at a tree rather than a bush but I do not know that I am ...
Baumann, Peter
core  

A problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge [PDF]

open access: yes, 2011
This paper raises a problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. It is argued that contrastivism fails to succeed in providing a modest solution to the sceptical paradox—i.e.
Kelp, Christoph
core   +1 more source

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