Results 41 to 50 of about 39,521 (116)
Hume on the Prospects for a Scientific Psychology
ABSTRACT In Section One of an Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume distinguishes between two sorts of writing on human nature: first, one that appeals to common sense to make virtue seem attractive and, second, one that attempts to describe the principles governing the mind.
Michael Jacovides
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Philosophy and Everyday Life: Thompson Clarke and the Legacy of Skepticism [PDF]
Philosophy and Everyday Life is the first monograph in English on the thought of Thompson Clarke (1928–2012). The essay has both (a) exegetical and (b) systematic ambitions.
Eichorn, Roger Edward
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Nietzsche's Conception of Skepticism as Intellectual Virtue and Vice
Abstract Recent approaches are unable to make full sense of Nietzsche's distinction between weak and strong skepticism (BGE 208–209; A54). In this paper, I propose an alternative interpretation. My suggestion is that this distinction is best understood in the context of his virtue epistemology.
Lorenzo Serini
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Abstract In this article I take a closer look at Adorno's methodology, and specifically the question of how – in Adorno's view – philosophy ought to be done. In this, my aim is to see whether there might be ‘quietist’ elements in his methodological account, i.e. the meta‐philosophical position of quietism as it stands against (scientific) naturalism in
Christian Lamp
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Daring to doubt! Shaftesbury, doubt, and polite conversation
Abstract Shaftesbury thought that dogmatism was an epistemic vice that violated the norms of good inquiry by inhibiting the proper exercise of reason. One way that Shaftesbury attempted to defend against dogmatic thought and culture was to recommend that society followed the norms of what he called “polite conversation.” This notion has received a fair
Sean Maroney
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La naturalidad del escepticismo
In this article I examine M. Williams’ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices.
Jesús Antonio Coll Mármol
doaj
What do we do when we suspend judgement?
Abstract According to a classical view, suspension of judgement is, like belief and disbelief, a cognitive state. However, as some authors (Crawford 2022; Lord 2020; McGrath 2021a, 2021b; Sosa 2019, 2021) have pointed out, to suspend judgement is also to perform a certain mental action.
Anne Meylan
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Abstract My aim in this article is to elucidate the nature of a form of intellectual and practical neutrality that is not covered by existing accounts of suspension of judgment. After rejecting some inadequate characterizations of this attitude of neutrality, I provide a positive characterization of it: it is a successful effort to resist certain ...
Benoit Gaultier
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Pessimism and Skepticism, Cartesian and Pyrrhonian [PDF]
This paper attempts to clarify and expand the analysis of philosophical pessimism by way of a productive analogy with philosophical skepticism. First, I advance the analogy: as skepticism is to knowledge, so pessimism is to hope. Second, I unpack several
Prescott, Paul Warden
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Abstract Does the biography of a philosopher have any relevance to assessing their philosophy? After considering and rejecting three distinct treatments of this question, a different answer is articulated here. Distinguishing between the content and approach of a philosophical text, this article argues that biography is relevant to assessing the ...
Paul O'Grady
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