Results 41 to 50 of about 294 (126)
Nietzsche's Conception of Skepticism as Intellectual Virtue and Vice
European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 33, Issue 4, Page 1466-1485, December 2025.Abstract Recent approaches are unable to make full sense of Nietzsche's distinction between weak and strong skepticism (BGE 208–209; A54). In this paper, I propose an alternative interpretation. My suggestion is that this distinction is best understood in the context of his virtue epistemology.
Lorenzo Serini
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European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 700-720, June 2025.Abstract In this article I take a closer look at Adorno's methodology, and specifically the question of how – in Adorno's view – philosophy ought to be done. In this, my aim is to see whether there might be ‘quietist’ elements in his methodological account, i.e. the meta‐philosophical position of quietism as it stands against (scientific) naturalism in
Christian Lamp
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Ancient Greek Skepticism [PDF]
, 2004 Visitado el 2 de marzo de 2012Sumario: 1. Academic vs. Pyrrhonian Skepticism -- 2. Academic Skepticism -- a. Arcesilaus -- i. Platonic Innovator -- ii. Attack on the Stoics -- iii. On Suspending Judgment -- iv.
Thorsrud, Harald
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A Neo-Pyrrhonian Response to the Disagreeing about Disagreement Argument [PDF]
, 2017 An objection that has been raised to the conciliatory stance on the epistemic significance of peer disagreement known as the Equal Weight View is that it is self-defeating, self-undermining, or self-refuting.
Machuca, Diego Emanuel +1 more
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Daring to doubt! Shaftesbury, doubt, and polite conversation
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 63, Issue 2, Page 192-210, June 2025.Abstract Shaftesbury thought that dogmatism was an epistemic vice that violated the norms of good inquiry by inhibiting the proper exercise of reason. One way that Shaftesbury attempted to defend against dogmatic thought and culture was to recommend that society followed the norms of what he called “polite conversation.” This notion has received a fair
Sean Maroney
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What do we do when we suspend judgement?
Philosophical Issues, Volume 34, Issue 1, Page 253-270, October 2024.Abstract According to a classical view, suspension of judgement is, like belief and disbelief, a cognitive state. However, as some authors (Crawford 2022; Lord 2020; McGrath 2021a, 2021b; Sosa 2019, 2021) have pointed out, to suspend judgement is also to perform a certain mental action.
Anne Meylan
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Emptiness, negation, and skepticism in Nāgārjuna and Sengzhao [PDF]
, 2023 This paper excavates the practice-oriented background and therapeutic significance of emptiness in the Madhyamaka philosophy attributed to Nāgārjuna and Sengzhao.
Nelson, Eric S.
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La naturalidad del escepticismo
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2012 In this article I examine M. Williams’ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices.
Jesús Antonio Coll Mármol
doaj
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 3, Page 348-357, September 2024.Abstract My aim in this article is to elucidate the nature of a form of intellectual and practical neutrality that is not covered by existing accounts of suspension of judgment. After rejecting some inadequate characterizations of this attitude of neutrality, I provide a positive characterization of it: it is a successful effort to resist certain ...
Benoit Gaultier
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, 2018 While ideas that can loosely be called skeptical may be found from very early in Greek philosophy, skepticism as an organized method of thinking in Greco-Roman antiquity appears in the post-Aristotelian period.
Richard Bett
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