Results 31 to 40 of about 115 (96)

What do we do when we suspend judgement?

open access: yesPhilosophical Issues, Volume 34, Issue 1, Page 253-270, October 2024.
Abstract According to a classical view, suspension of judgement is, like belief and disbelief, a cognitive state. However, as some authors (Crawford 2022; Lord 2020; McGrath 2021a, 2021b; Sosa 2019, 2021) have pointed out, to suspend judgement is also to perform a certain mental action.
Anne Meylan
wiley   +1 more source

The effort to be neutral

open access: yesThe Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 3, Page 348-357, September 2024.
Abstract My aim in this article is to elucidate the nature of a form of intellectual and practical neutrality that is not covered by existing accounts of suspension of judgment. After rejecting some inadequate characterizations of this attitude of neutrality, I provide a positive characterization of it: it is a successful effort to resist certain ...
Benoit Gaultier
wiley   +1 more source

La naturalidad del escepticismo

open access: yesPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2012
In this article I examine M. Williams’ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices.
Jesús Antonio Coll Mármol
doaj  

Philosophy and biography

open access: yesMetaphilosophy, Volume 55, Issue 3, Page 328-337, July 2024.
Abstract Does the biography of a philosopher have any relevance to assessing their philosophy? After considering and rejecting three distinct treatments of this question, a different answer is articulated here. Distinguishing between the content and approach of a philosophical text, this article argues that biography is relevant to assessing the ...
Paul O'Grady
wiley   +1 more source

Naturalizing skepticism

open access: yesMetaphilosophy, Volume 55, Issue 3, Page 301-315, July 2024.
Abstract Naturalism, construed as the idea that philosophy should be continuous with science, is a highly influential view. Its consequences for epistemology, however, are rather odd. Many believe that naturalized epistemology allows eschewing traditional skeptical challenges.
Marc Jiménez‐Rolland
wiley   +1 more source

Davison on Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic

open access: yesPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2005
In his defense of a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Donald Davidson insists that (i) we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief, and (ii) given the nature of beliefs, most of our be-liefs are veridical.
Otávio Bueno
doaj  

Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory [PDF]

open access: yesInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2012
This paper applies speech-act theory to craft a new response to Pyrrhonian skepticism and diagnose its appeal. Carefully distinguishing between different levels of language-use and noting their interrelations can help us identify a subtle mistake in a key Pyrrhonian argument.
openaire   +2 more sources

The argument from undecidable dissension

open access: yesPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology
The five modes of suspension of judgment outlined by Sextus Empiricus (HP XV 164-188) coordinate a complex argumentative strategy to prompt the general suspension of judgment.
Hugo Enrique Sánchez López
doaj   +1 more source

Conflicting Appearances, Suspension of Judgment, and Pyrrhonian Skepticism without Commitment

open access: yesJournal of the History of Philosophy, 2022
By means of the Ten Modes, Pyrrhonian skeptics appeal to conflicting appearances to bring about suspension of judgment. However, precisely how the skeptic might do so in a nondogmatic manner is not entirely clear. In this paper, I argue that existing accounts of the Modes face significant objections, and I defend an alternative account that better ...
openaire   +2 more sources

Doubt Undogmatized

open access: yesPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2000
It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart.
Duncan Pritchard
doaj  

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