Results 11 to 20 of about 39,521 (116)
Davison on Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2005 In his defense of a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Donald Davidson insists that (i) we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief, and (ii) given the nature of beliefs, most of our be-liefs are veridical.
Otávio Bueno
doaj +1 more source
The Curved Logic of Knowledge: Pyrrhonian Skepticism as Non-Commutativity [PDF]
We develop a curved logic of knowledge in which Pyrrhonian skepticism appears as a structural interaction between two context operators. Knowledge is modeled as an interior comonad, and suspension of judgment (epochē) as the cofree comonad generated by a one-step “witness of unknowability.” The failure of these two operators to commute is our epistemic
Bruhacs, Lorand
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Adaptation, Activism, and the Looming Climate Disaster†
Educational Theory, Volume 73, Issue 6, Page 801-821, December 2023., 2023 Abstract It is likely that the process of global climate change will continue to accelerate. There is a lack of political will to confront the problem and the consequences for humanity — including widespread suffering and institutional destabilization — will be disastrous. How should educators respond to a catastrophic future?
Bryan R. Warnick
wiley +1 more source
Understanding Wittgenstein's positive philosophy through language‐games: Giving philosophy peace
Philosophical Investigations, Volume 46, Issue 3, Page 376-394, July 2023., 2023 Abstract A significant discrepancy in Wittgenstein's studies is whether Philosophical Investigations contains any trace of positive philosophy, notwithstanding the author's apparent anti‐theoretic position. This study argues that the so‐called ‘Chapter on philosophy’ in the Investigations §§89–133 contains negative and positive vocabulary and the use ...
Andrey Pukhaev
wiley +1 more source
Commitment and Reasons – A Comment on Ruth Chang, ‘Three Dogmas of Normativity’
Journal of Applied Philosophy, Volume 40, Issue 2, Page 220-230, May 2023., 2023 ABSTRACT Ruth Chang has argued convincingly that we must recognize that some choices will not involve strict, univocal comparison of options. How, then, can such choices be made well? Chang suggests that commitment is a fundamental way of ‘putting one's very self’ behind a normative consideration, thereby ‘endow[ing] that consideration with the ...
Peter Railton
wiley +1 more source
The Beginning of Hegel's Logic
Philosophy Compass, Volume 18, Issue 5, May 2023., 2023 Abstract This article discusses two topics, both commonly referred to using the label “the beginning of Hegel's Logic”: (1) Hegel's justification for the claim that a science of logic must begin by considering the concept of “pure being”. (2) Hegel's discussion of the concepts “being”, “nothing”, and “becoming” in the first chapter of his Logic ...
Robb Dunphy
wiley +1 more source
Commentary on “Can a good philosophical contribution be made just by asking a question?”
Metaphilosophy, Volume 54, Issue 1, Page 55-60, January 2023., 2023 Abstract This paper explains some of the reasoning behind “Can a Good Philosophical Contribution Be Made Just by Asking a Question?,” a paper which consists solely in its title and which is published in the same issue of the journal as the present paper. The method for explaining that reasoning consists in making available a lightly edited version of a
Joshua Habgood‐Coote +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Deep Disagreement (Part 2): Epistemology of Deep Disagreement
Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 12, December 2022., 2022 Abstract What is the epistemological significance of deep disagreement? Part I explored the nature of deep disagreement, while Part II considers its epistemological significance. It focuses on two core problems: the incommensurability and the rational resolvability problems. We critically survey key responses to these challenges, before raising worries
Chris Ranalli, Thirza Lagewaard
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A new bridge principle for the normativity of logic
Theoria, Volume 88, Issue 6, Page 1274-1292, December 2022., 2022 Abstract Logic appears to be normative for rational belief. The thesis of the normativity of logic holds that indeed logic has such a normative status. Gilbert Harman has questioned it, thereby giving rise to what has been called “Harman's skeptical challenge”.
Francesco Orilia
wiley +1 more source
, 2018 In this chapter I sympathetically consider the idea that skepticism is an epistemic virtue. I argue that this depends on whether skepticism is admirable, and articulate three defenses of skepticism as admirable: a Pyrrhonian defense (on which skepticism
Hazlett, Allan, Allan Hazlett
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