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Coordinating collaborative infectious disease modeling projects with the hubverse

Consortium of Infectious Disease Modeling Hubs, Kerr M, Borchering R, Rivadeneira AC, Contamin L, Funk S, Hochheiser H, Howerton E, Krystalli A, Shandross L, Reich NG.   +10 more
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The Random Oracle Model

2021
In the previous chapter we looked at dedicated forms of hash functions that we categorized as non-cryptographic hash functions. Their common denominator is that we can prove the existence of constructions that fulfill the properties (e.g., pairwise independence) without having to rely on unproven assumptions.
Arno Mittelbach, Marc Fischlin
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Subquadratic SNARGs in the Random Oracle Model

2021
In a seminal work, Micali (FOCS 1994) gave the first succinct non-interactive argument (SNARG) in the random oracle model (ROM). The construction combines a PCP and a cryptographic commitment, and has several attractive features: it is plausibly post-quantum; it can be heuristically instantiated via lightweight cryptography; and it has a transparent ...
Alessandro Chiesa, Eylon Yogev
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Revisiting TESLA in the Quantum Random Oracle Model

2017
We study a scheme of Bai and Galbraith (CT-RSA’14), also known as TESLA. TESLA was thought to have a tight security reduction from the learning with errors problem (LWE) in the random oracle model (ROM). Moreover, a variant using chameleon hash functions was lifted to the quantum random oracle model (QROM).
Alkim, Erdem, Bindel, Nina, Buchmann, Johannes, Dagdelen, Özgür, Eaton, Edward, Gutoski, Gus, Krämer, Juliane, Pawlega, Filip   +7 more
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Quantum Random Oracle Model with Auxiliary Input

2019
The random oracle model (ROM) is an idealized model where hash functions are modeled as random functions that are only accessible as oracles. Although the ROM has been used for proving many cryptographic schemes, it has (at least) two problems. First, the ROM does not capture quantum adversaries. Second, it does not capture non-uniform adversaries that
Minki Hhan, Keita Xagawa, Takashi Yamakawa   +2 more
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The Random Oracle Model

2010
The signature schemes described in the previous chapters, whether based on the RSA/strong RSA assumptions or bilinear maps, represent essentially the extent of what is currently known regarding efficient yet provably secure signature schemes.
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Succinct Arguments in the Quantum Random Oracle Model

2019
Succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) are highly efficient certificates of membership in non-deterministic languages. Constructions of SNARGs in the random oracle model are widely believed to be post-quantum secure, provided the oracle is instantiated with a suitable post-quantum hash function. No formal evidence, however, supports this belief.
Alessandro Chiesa, Peter Manohar, Nicholas Spooner   +2 more
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Security Analysis Based on Quantum Random Oracle Model

2020
Random oracle model is a general security analysis tool for rigorous security proof and effective cryptographic protocol design. In the quantum world, the attempts of constructing a quantum random oracle (QRO) have been made, such as quantum-accessible random oracle for post-quantum cryptography and quantum random oracle for quantum cryptography.
Tao Shang, Jianwei Liu
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IBE in Adaptive-Identity Model Without Random Oracles

2011
In the previous chapters, we have seen several IBE schemes and their extension to HIBE. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the security model for IBE schemes was introduced by Boneh and Franklin and allows the adversary to make both adaptiveidentity and adaptive-chosen ciphertext attacks.
Sanjit Chatterjee, Palash Sarkar
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