Results 241 to 250 of about 23,193 (292)
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2001
Abstract Grice begins this chapter by discussing to what extent the notion of variable rationality can be derived from that of flat rationality, and thus from the concept of a rational being alone. He then draws a distinction between ‘explanatory’ (motivating) and ‘justificatory’ (normative) reasons, as well as ‘personal’ reasons that ...
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Abstract Grice begins this chapter by discussing to what extent the notion of variable rationality can be derived from that of flat rationality, and thus from the concept of a rational being alone. He then draws a distinction between ‘explanatory’ (motivating) and ‘justificatory’ (normative) reasons, as well as ‘personal’ reasons that ...
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Annual Review of Psychology, 1990
Strict theories of reasoning are schoolmarmish in their insistence on rules and structure, but this gives them an advantage when inference is relatively well behaved. In the case of reasoning with deductively valid arguments, Strict theories give a convincing account of the universality of certain inference forms and the productivity of reasoning in ...
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Strict theories of reasoning are schoolmarmish in their insistence on rules and structure, but this gives them an advantage when inference is relatively well behaved. In the case of reasoning with deductively valid arguments, Strict theories give a convincing account of the universality of certain inference forms and the productivity of reasoning in ...
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2001
Abstract Grice deals with the nature of practical and non‐practical (‘alethic’) reasoning, particularly what may be called imperfect reasoning. It consists of ‘misreasoning’ (the misapplication of good principles of reasoning), ‘incomplete reasoning’ (formally invalid but nonetheless correct inferences due to a missing premise that is ...
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Abstract Grice deals with the nature of practical and non‐practical (‘alethic’) reasoning, particularly what may be called imperfect reasoning. It consists of ‘misreasoning’ (the misapplication of good principles of reasoning), ‘incomplete reasoning’ (formally invalid but nonetheless correct inferences due to a missing premise that is ...
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1997
Abstract We have reasons to believe, to act, to feel. We deal in reasons at every turn—for example I have reason to believe you covered for me in an emergency, reason to feel grateful and so reason to thank you in some more or less substantial way.
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Abstract We have reasons to believe, to act, to feel. We deal in reasons at every turn—for example I have reason to believe you covered for me in an emergency, reason to feel grateful and so reason to thank you in some more or less substantial way.
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2023
Abstract Suppose Bob says, “I want to have reasons for what I do.” The skeptic replies, “But why do you want to have reasons?” Bob responds, “It’s just a brute fact about me. I want to have reasons for what I do.” The skeptic pounces: “But then you’re unreasonable.
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Abstract Suppose Bob says, “I want to have reasons for what I do.” The skeptic replies, “But why do you want to have reasons?” Bob responds, “It’s just a brute fact about me. I want to have reasons for what I do.” The skeptic pounces: “But then you’re unreasonable.
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2005
AbstractThis chapter examines Hume’s theory of empirical reason, and the difference between its rational and its irrational exercise (reasoning reasonably and unreasonably). The theory has five structural levels: (1) reasoning from one matter of fact or real existence to another takes the form of an inference from an impression to an idea; (2 ...
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AbstractThis chapter examines Hume’s theory of empirical reason, and the difference between its rational and its irrational exercise (reasoning reasonably and unreasonably). The theory has five structural levels: (1) reasoning from one matter of fact or real existence to another takes the form of an inference from an impression to an idea; (2 ...
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Episteme, 2015
ABSTRACTHilary Kornblith explores the prospects for reasons eliminationism, the view that reasons ought not to be regarded as being of central importance in epistemology. I reply by conceding that reasons may not be necessary for knowledge, in at least some cases, but I argue that they are nevertheless vitally important in epistemology more broadly ...
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ABSTRACTHilary Kornblith explores the prospects for reasons eliminationism, the view that reasons ought not to be regarded as being of central importance in epistemology. I reply by conceding that reasons may not be necessary for knowledge, in at least some cases, but I argue that they are nevertheless vitally important in epistemology more broadly ...
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Symposium, 1999
Katherine Mo"ison charges that in my book, Back to Reality, ffailed to make my case for the adoption of a modest realism in postmodem (na"ative) therapy, because f failed to establish the motive behind that movement's adoption of antirealism. Infact, in Back to Reality, I put forth several reasons for therapists of all stripes to favor a modest realism
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Katherine Mo"ison charges that in my book, Back to Reality, ffailed to make my case for the adoption of a modest realism in postmodem (na"ative) therapy, because f failed to establish the motive behind that movement's adoption of antirealism. Infact, in Back to Reality, I put forth several reasons for therapists of all stripes to favor a modest realism
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2018
Many think it is a truism that, whatever else they are, normative reasons are the kind of things that we reason with. Agents use reasons as guides to determine what to do, as well as to determine what to believe, or not believe. Jonathan Way and others have argued for a stronger claim that reasons just are premises in practical or theoretical reasoning.
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Many think it is a truism that, whatever else they are, normative reasons are the kind of things that we reason with. Agents use reasons as guides to determine what to do, as well as to determine what to believe, or not believe. Jonathan Way and others have argued for a stronger claim that reasons just are premises in practical or theoretical reasoning.
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2010
This chapter examines some popular justifications for public reason-giving common in liberal political thought. An obvious way of arguing in favor of the duty to give reasons is to point out that publicly substantiating decisions is an intrinsically valuable practice. Giving reasons simply makes for better decision-making.
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This chapter examines some popular justifications for public reason-giving common in liberal political thought. An obvious way of arguing in favor of the duty to give reasons is to point out that publicly substantiating decisions is an intrinsically valuable practice. Giving reasons simply makes for better decision-making.
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