Results 191 to 200 of about 2,247,343 (229)
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Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2006
In two experiments we investigated three-term reasoning with spatial relational assertions using the preposition between as compared to projective prepositions (such as to the left of). For each kind of assertion we distinguish the referent expression (i.e., the grammatical subject) from the relatum expression (i.e., the internal argument of the ...
Hörnig, Robin +2 more
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In two experiments we investigated three-term reasoning with spatial relational assertions using the preposition between as compared to projective prepositions (such as to the left of). For each kind of assertion we distinguish the referent expression (i.e., the grammatical subject) from the relatum expression (i.e., the internal argument of the ...
Hörnig, Robin +2 more
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IS REASONABLE DOUBT REASONABLE?
Legal Theory, 2003It is difficult, if not impossible, to so define the term “reasonable doubt” as to satisfy a subtle and metaphysical mind, bent on the detection of some point, however attenuated, upon which to hang a criticism. —Supreme Court of VirginiaMcCue v. Commonwealth, 103 Va.
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Philotheos, 2018
This article is published as Vuckovic, M. (2018). Reason’s Reasons: First Principles in the Second-Century Pagan Apologetic. Philotheos, 18(2), 208-232. https://doi.org/10.5840/philotheos201818216. ; The 2-c debate between the Greek Apologists and the pagan Graeco-Roman tradition is multifaceted and complex.
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This article is published as Vuckovic, M. (2018). Reason’s Reasons: First Principles in the Second-Century Pagan Apologetic. Philotheos, 18(2), 208-232. https://doi.org/10.5840/philotheos201818216. ; The 2-c debate between the Greek Apologists and the pagan Graeco-Roman tradition is multifaceted and complex.
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WIREs Cognitive Science, 1999
AbstractThis article begins with an account of logic, and of how logicians formulate formal rules of inference for the sentential calculus, which hinges on analogs of negation and the connectivesif, or, andand. It considers the various ways in which computer scientists have written programs to prove the validity of inferences in this and other domains.
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AbstractThis article begins with an account of logic, and of how logicians formulate formal rules of inference for the sentential calculus, which hinges on analogs of negation and the connectivesif, or, andand. It considers the various ways in which computer scientists have written programs to prove the validity of inferences in this and other domains.
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Contemporary Psychology: A Journal of Reviews, 1996
Several varieties of metareasoning are discussed. The prototypical case is argument analysis, namely the interpretation and/or evaluation of arguments. A second special case is self-reflective argumentation. A third case is methodological reflection, namely the formulation, interpretation, evaluation, and application of methodological principles; these
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Several varieties of metareasoning are discussed. The prototypical case is argument analysis, namely the interpretation and/or evaluation of arguments. A second special case is self-reflective argumentation. A third case is methodological reflection, namely the formulation, interpretation, evaluation, and application of methodological principles; these
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Reasons, practical reason, and practical reasoning
Ratio, 2004AbstractThe concepts of reasons as supporting elements, of practical reason as a capacity, and of practical reasoning as a process are central in the theory of action. This paper provides a brief account of each. Several kinds of reason for action are distinguished.
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2005
AbstractThis chapter examines Hume’s theory of empirical reason, and the difference between its rational and its irrational exercise (reasoning reasonably and unreasonably). The theory has five structural levels: (1) reasoning from one matter of fact or real existence to another takes the form of an inference from an impression to an idea; (2 ...
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AbstractThis chapter examines Hume’s theory of empirical reason, and the difference between its rational and its irrational exercise (reasoning reasonably and unreasonably). The theory has five structural levels: (1) reasoning from one matter of fact or real existence to another takes the form of an inference from an impression to an idea; (2 ...
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Episteme, 2015
ABSTRACTHilary Kornblith explores the prospects for reasons eliminationism, the view that reasons ought not to be regarded as being of central importance in epistemology. I reply by conceding that reasons may not be necessary for knowledge, in at least some cases, but I argue that they are nevertheless vitally important in epistemology more broadly ...
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ABSTRACTHilary Kornblith explores the prospects for reasons eliminationism, the view that reasons ought not to be regarded as being of central importance in epistemology. I reply by conceding that reasons may not be necessary for knowledge, in at least some cases, but I argue that they are nevertheless vitally important in epistemology more broadly ...
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2006
Legal reasoning has several aspects. On the one hand it is necessary to determine which rules can play a role in legal arguments, which rules are legal rules. The formal sources of law, such as legislation, treaties and case law, play a central role in this connection.
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Legal reasoning has several aspects. On the one hand it is necessary to determine which rules can play a role in legal arguments, which rules are legal rules. The formal sources of law, such as legislation, treaties and case law, play a central role in this connection.
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2023
Abstract Suppose Bob says, “I want to have reasons for what I do.” The skeptic replies, “But why do you want to have reasons?” Bob responds, “It’s just a brute fact about me. I want to have reasons for what I do.” The skeptic pounces: “But then you’re unreasonable.
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Abstract Suppose Bob says, “I want to have reasons for what I do.” The skeptic replies, “But why do you want to have reasons?” Bob responds, “It’s just a brute fact about me. I want to have reasons for what I do.” The skeptic pounces: “But then you’re unreasonable.
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